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In 1969, the Supreme Court memorably declared in Tinker v. 
Des Moines Independent Community School District1 that students 
do not “shed their constitutional rights inside the schoolhouse 
gates.”2  The right in question was free speech; the students 
claiming the benefit of that right were wearing black armbands to 
protest the Vietnam War.3  Tinker has been lauded as the 
“highwater mark” of students’ speech rights,4 and, in the most 
obvious way, it is—none of the Court’s post-Tinker student speech 
decisions have protected students’ rights as broadly as Tinker.  
However, Tinker also released a sort of Noahic Flood: Prior to 
Tinker, the Court had not recognized that students had any free 
speech rights in schools other than a right to not participate in 
compelled political speech, such as a daily, mandatory recitation of 
the Pledge of Allegiance.5  When the Court decided Tinker, only a 
handful of lower courts were even exploring the existence of 
 
  Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law.  Earlier 
iterations of this Article and its component Parts were presented at Wake 
Forest University School of Law’s excellent conference “Privatizing the Public 
Good: Emerging Trends in K-16 Education,” Michigan State University College 
of Law, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law, the Law and 
Society Association annual meeting, and the Education Law Association annual 
meeting.  The Article benefited greatly from the thoughtful comments of 
participants in those settings as well as from Joseph Blocher, Caroline Mala 
Corbin, Catherine Yongsoo Kim, Renee Newman Knake, Michael A. Lawrence, 
Helen Norton, Frank S. Ravitch, Kevin Saunders, William Thro, Emily Gold 
Waldman, and Arthur Wrobel; from the editorial assistance of the Wake Forest 
Law Review staff; and from the helpful research assistance of Todd Fraley, 
Sheila Terry, and Patrick O’Brien. 
 1. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 2. Id. at 506. 
 3. Id. at 504. 
 4. Broussard v. Sch. Bd., 801 F. Supp. 1526, 1534 (E.D. Va. 1992). 
 5. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); Kristi L. 
Bowman, The Civil Rights Roots of Tinker’s Disruption Tests, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 
1129, 1130 (2009). 
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students’ speech rights, and the few so engaged were proceeding 
gingerly.6 
The significance of Tinker is not only that it created affirmative 
speech rights for students, however.  The Tinker Court also 
articulated a relationship between students’ liberty and adults’ 
democratic self-governance that has echoed through the Court’s 
public school First Amendment decisions ever since.  Simply put, 
schools create citizens to sustain our democracy by training students 
to know and exercise their First Amendment rights.7 
Today, the legal and social landscapes are both substantially 
different than they were a half-century ago: schools are no longer 
environments where a principal can say, “it’s my way or the 
highway,” and the courts will agree.8  Courts across the country now 
regularly hear school speech cases.  Several Supreme Court 
decisions have explored the boundaries of students’, teachers’, and 
the government’s speech rights in schools, and only one Supreme 
Court Justice still thinks students do not have free speech rights in 
public schools.   
These Supreme Court decisions have clarified the answers to 
some questions, but many other questions remain—such as how the 
“recently minted”9 government speech doctrine will affect the 
already unusual contours of free speech in schools.10  According to 
the Court in its 2009 decision in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,11 
and previous decisions, when the government has not set forth its 
viewpoint—in other words, when it is merely the neutral arbiter of a 
forum—then the government speech doctrine does not affect private 
speakers’ rights.12  In these situations (at least outside the 
 
 6. Bowman, supra note 5, at 1148, 1152–53. 
 7. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507. 
 8. This is a comment from Gene Reynolds, who was the high school 
principal in the legendary case Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1998), 
describing the way schools operated before Tinker.  Reynolds made this 
comment at the September 2012 symposium at the University of Missouri-
Kansas City, “Forty Years of Landmark School Speech Cases Through the Eyes 
of Those Who Were There.”  The author attended and presented at that 
symposium. 
 9. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481–83 (2009) (Stevens, 
J., concurring). 
 10. Joseph Blocher makes the same prediction in the emerging trend of 
school naming rights.  Joseph Blocher, School Naming Rights and the First 
Amendment’s Perfect Storm, 96 GEO. L.J. 1, 4 (2007); see also MARK G. YUDOF, 
WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 211 (1980) (“Public schools present a kaleidoscopic 
panoply of First Amendment situations . . . .”); Alan Brownstein, The Nonforum 
as First Amendment Category: Bringing Order Out of the Chaos of Free Speech 
Cases Involving School-Sponsored Activities, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 723–24, 
734–40 (2009). 
 11. 555 U.S. 460. 
 12. Id. at 468–69. 
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schoolhouse gates), speech may be restricted only based on 
presumptively viewpoint-neutral criteria applicable to all.13  
However, when the government sets forth its own message—in a 
city park, in a hospital that accepts public funds, via government 
grants to support the creation of art, possibly in a public school—it 
may constitutionally quash private speakers’ attempts to alter its 
message.14  The implications of the government speech doctrine, in 
Erwin Chemerinsky’s words, are “potentially enormous.”15 
So what might these implications be for speech in public 
schools?  The government speaks a lot in schools, as do students and 
teachers.  School speech cases are hardly rare, and the Supreme 
Court has determined that inside schools, the free speech rules are 
different from the default rules in ways that already favor the 
government.16  However, few courts or commentators have explored 
how the government speech doctrine would apply to cases about 
speech in schools, and also whether it should.17  This is a substantial 
gap because the government speech doctrine is as important as it is 
problematic, and it is gaining momentum.18 
The first Part of this Article analyzes how the Court has 
grounded its school speech rules in the uniqueness of the school 
environment, in particular focusing on the school’s role as creating 
the next generation of citizens.  The second Part moves to the 
government speech doctrine specifically, discussing the development 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 467–68. 
 15. Erwin Chemerinsky, Moving to the Right, Perhaps Sharply to the Right, 
12 GREEN BAG 2D 413, 426 (2009); see also Helen Norton, Imaginary Threats to 
Government’s Expressive Interests, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1265, 1283 (2011) 
(“The government’s expressive claims in these cases are potentially 
breathtaking in scope . . . .”). 
 16. Brownstein, supra note 10, at 724–25, 808 (discussing the incredible 
range of speech-in-schools cases and noting that “making decisions about speech 
is the core function of a school’s educational mission . . . . [r]egulating speech is 
fundamental to what an educator does”); Lee Goldman, Student Speech and the 
First Amendment: A Comprehensive Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 395, 396 (2011); 
Frederick Schauer, Abandoning the Guidance Function: Morse v. Frederick, 
2007 SUP. CT. REV. 205, 208 (2007). 
 17. Joseph Blocher’s article and Alan Brownstein’s article provide excellent 
analysis of some of the issues that arise when considering applying the 
government speech doctrine to school speech situations, although the former 
article is limited to the situation contained in its title, and the latter advocates 
persuasively for a nonforum speech category.  See generally Blocher, supra note 
10; Brownstein, supra note 10.  Additionally, Helen Norton’s article analyzes a 
recent Fifth Circuit decision in which a high school cheerleader was dismissed 
from the cheerleading squad for refusing to cheer for a basketball player who 
had allegedly sexually assaulted her.  Norton, supra note 15, at 1275–78. 
 18. Randall P. Bezanson, The Manner of Government Speech, 87 DENV. U. 
L. REV. 809, 817 (2010) (“Government speech and the government speech forum 
will not go away.”). 
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of the doctrine and explaining the doctrine’s general relevance to 
school speech cases.  The third and fourth Parts consider the 
potential impact of the doctrine on many specific types of school 
speech cases that I classify into two broad categories: (1) speech 
traditionally assumed to belong to states and school districts, and 
(2) speech to which students (and in some cases also the school) have 
a substantial claim.  Throughout the discussion of specific types of 
speech conflicts, I answer difficult questions such as how to identify 
when speech belongs to the government and what to do when it 
appears that both the government and someone else are 
simultaneously speaking.  I also examine the impact the 
government speech doctrine would have on each of these types of 
speech conflicts if imported wholesale: in some of the situations 
addressed in this Article, schools already have so much authority 
that the doctrine would have little impact on principles or outcomes; 
in other situations, such a change would have a substantial impact 
on existing principles or outcomes, including overturning one 
Supreme Court plurality decision and, if the doctrine were extended 
to cover all student speech cases, mooting the Supreme Court’s 
student speech quartet. 
Ultimately, of all the types of school speech cases I consider, I 
argue that the government speech doctrine should only apply to 
teachers’ instructional speech.  Although I reach the conclusion for 
all other categories that the government speech doctrine should not 
apply, the reasons supporting this outcome vary substantially 
depending on the type of conflict considered.  In arriving at these 
conclusions, I consider whether the central purpose of the doctrine 
(the government retaining control over its own message) is a solid fit 
for the category of conflicts considered and how the doctrine would 
impact the two public goods that public education creates—the 
development of the next generation of citizens and a check on that 
development through the political and/or judicial process.  
Extending the doctrine further than I advocate may be an attractive 
option for states, schools, and courts at the very least because 
resolving cases under the government speech doctrine is easier and 
faster than using much existing caselaw,19 but such an extension 
 
 19. Existing student speech doctrine is already so muddled that Supreme 
Court Justices even joked about the doctrinal confusion during the 2007 oral 
argument in Morse v. Frederick, the “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” banner case: 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You think the law was clearly established 
when this happened that the principal, the instant the banner was 
unfurled, snowballs are flying around, the torch is coming, should have 
said oh, I remember under Tinker I can only take the sign down if it’s 
disruptive.  But then under Fraser I can do something if it interferes 
with the basic mission, and under Kuhlmeier I’ve got this other thing.  
So she should have known at that point that she could not take the 
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would lead to the “enclaves of totalitarianism” the court cautioned 
against in Tinker, in which students become “closed-circuit 
recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate.”20  
Future citizens’ deliberations would suffer the effects of such a 
change, and that cost is too great. 
I.  THE PUBLIC GOODS CREATED BY FREE SPEECH IN SCHOOLS 
Analyzing whether the government speech doctrine should be 
imported into various types of school speech cases involves asking 
how it would change the work that the First Amendment does in 
public schools.  As this Part discusses, the Supreme Court has 
recognized schools’ role in creating citizens; in various ways and to 
different degrees, free speech rights affect that function. 
A. Creating Citizens 
Public education is both a private good and a public good—it 
directly benefits those who pay for it (adult taxpayers who are 
parents of public school students) and arguably benefits even more 
those who do not (students themselves, adult taxpayers who are 
benefited by the education of other people’s children, and adults who 
 
banner down, and it was so clear that she should have to pay out of her 
own pocket because of it. 
MR. MERTZ [attorney for Frederick]: Mr. Chief Justice, there are two 
different time points we have to talk about.  There’s the heat of the 
moment out there on the street, but then later back in the office when 
she actually decided to levy the punishment after she had talked to him, 
after she heard why he did it and why he didn’t do it, after she had had a 
chance to consult with the school district’s counsel.  At that point in the 
calmness of her office, then she should indeed have known it.  And she 
did testify that she had taken a master’s degree course in school law in 
which she studied Kuhlmeier and Fraser and Tinker.  So— 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And so it should be perfectly clear to her 
exactly what she could and couldn’t do. 
MR. MERTZ: Yes. 
JUSTICE SCALIA: As it is to us, right? (Laughter.) 
JUSTICE SOUTER: I mean, we have a debate here for going on 50 
minutes about what Tinker means, about the proper characterization of 
the behavior, the nonspeech behavior.  The school’s terms in dealing 
with the kids that morning.  The meaning of that statement.  We’ve been 
debating this in this courtroom for going on an hour, and it seems to me 
however you come out, there is reasonable debate.  Should the teacher 
have known, even in the, in the calm deliberative atmosphere of the 
school later, what the correct answer is? 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 48–50, Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 
(2007) (No. 06-278), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments 
/argument_transcripts/06-278.pdf. 
 20. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969). 
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do not pay property taxes).21  Some of public education’s positive 
externalities are economic: when students receive at least a basic 
education, they become adults who are employable and thus can 
contribute to the economy.  Some of the positive externalities are 
civic: students become adults who participate in our democratic 
government and ultimately sustain it.22 
For nearly a century, the Supreme Court has referred to 
education’s positive civic externalities in cases that arise out of 
public schools.23  The Court’s two most famous twentieth-century 
education decisions are based in large part on schools’ creation of 
citizens.24  In the first of these two landmark cases, Brown v. Board 
of Education,25 the Court memorably declared in 1954 that 
“separate but equal” public schools were unconstitutional.26  In a 
phrase that has become one of the most cited from Brown, the Court 
described education as “perhaps the most important function of 
state and local governments.”27  The Court then articulated why this 
is the case: 
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great 
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of 
the importance of education to our democratic society.  It is 
required in the performance of our most basic public 
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces.  It is the very 
foundation of good citizenship.  Today it is a principal 
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
 
 21. Kristi Bowman, Before School Districts Go Broke: A Proposal for 
Federal Reform, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 895, 899–900, 902–03, 917 (2010); Jane S. 
Shaw, Education—A Bad Public Good?, 15 INDEP. REV. 241, 241 (2010). 
 22. Bowman, supra note 21, at 935–36.  As Anne C. Dailey extensively and 
thoughtfully analyzes, “early caregiving and family relationships lay down the 
foundational processes of democratic citizenship” and schools build on these 
foundations.  Anne C. Dailey, Developing Citizens, 91 IOWA L. REV. 431, 435 
(2006). 
 23. See, e.g., Aaron H. Caplan, Freedom of Speech in School and Prison, 85 
WASH. L. REV. 71, 94–99 (2010) (discussing the Court’s view of the purpose of 
public schools as articulated in its 1940s flag salute cases involving Jehovah’s 
Witness children); Dailey, supra note 22, at 438–60 (discussing Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), prohibiting public schools from instructing 
students in the German language before eighth grade and Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), prohibiting the state from compelling attendance 
in public schools, or in private schools under very limited circumstances). 
 24. These decisions were not the first cases in which the Court considered 
schools’ civic role, however.  See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76–77 
(1979) (“The importance of public schools in the preparation of individuals for 
participation as citizens . . . has long been recognized by our decisions.”); see 
also Bowman, supra note 21, at 935–36 n.218. 
 25. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 26. Id. at 495; see also Pamela W. Carter & Phoebe A. Roaf, A Historic 
Overview of Brown v. Board of Education, 51 LA. L.J. 410, 410 (2004). 
 27. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. 
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preparing him for later professional training, and in helping 
him to adjust normally to his environment.  In these days, it is 
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed 
in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.  Such an 
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a 
right which must be made available to all on equal terms.28 
The Court’s focus in Brown was, of course, on racial equality in 
education.  But Tinker v. Des Moines, about liberty in schools, 
similarly addressed the role of schools in creating citizens.29  In 
Tinker, the Court held that students have free speech rights in 
public schools, although those rights are more limited than in the 
nonschool environment.30  The Tinker Court stated: “state-operated 
schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. . . .  [S]tudents may 
not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the 
State chooses to communicate.  They may not be confined to the 
expression of those sentiments that are officially approved.”31  The 
Tinker majority quoted an earlier university faculty speech case, 
Keyishan v. Board of Regents,32 as part of the proposition that “[t]he 
classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’  The Nation’s 
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that 
robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of 
tongues, (rather) than through any kind of authoritative 
selection.’”33  Similarly, the Tinker decision also excerpted some of 
the most famous language from the Court’s decision in the 1943 
pledge of allegiance case West Virginia v. Barnette34: “That [schools] 
are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous 
protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not 
to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount 
important principles of our government as mere platitudes.”35  
Tinker did not grant students unlimited speech rights in schools, 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 30. Id. at 511. 
 31. Id. at 511–12 (“In order to submerge the individual and develop ideal 
citizens, Sparta assembled the males at seven into barracks and intrusted [sic] 
their subsequent education and training to official guardians.  Although such 
measures have been deliberately approved by men of great genius, their ideas 
touching the relation between individual and State were wholly different from 
those upon which our institutions rest; and it hardly will be affirmed that any 
Legislature could impose such restrictions upon the people of a state without 
doing violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitution.” (quoting Meyer v. 
Nebraska 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923))). 
 32. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
 33. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512 (quoting Keyishan, 385 U.S. at 603) (striking 
down a statutory provision that public employees, including university faculty, 
sign statements declaring themselves to not be communists). 
 34. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 35. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637). 
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however—even under Tinker, schools can discipline students for 
speech that substantially or materially disrupts the educational 
process, is reasonably forecast to do so, or impinges on the rights or 
others.36  These limitations balance students’ rights with schools’ 
needs to maintain an orderly and thus potentially effective 
educational environment. 
Both Brown and Tinker were substantial departures from what 
came before them.  They created equality rights and speech rights 
where “separate but equal” had been constitutional and teachers 
and administrators had wielded largely unquestioned authority over 
students.  As such, both cases needed to justify their new directions.  
They both did so, in part, by emphasizing what was unique about 
public schools’ social function.37  Subsequent decisions, especially in 
free speech cases, have continued to articulate and refine public 
schools’ unique role by building on Brown and Tinker. 
In 1986, the Court in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser38 
held that a high school could discipline a student for delivering a 
lewd speech at an all-school assembly.  In doing so, it quoted a high 
school history book for the principle that “public education must 
prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic. . . .  It must inculcate 
the habits and manners of civility as values in themselves conducive 
to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-government 
in the community and the nation.”39  The Court then continued in its 
own words: 
These fundamental values of “habits and manners of civility” 
essential to a democratic society must, of course, include 
tolerance of divergent political and religious views, even when 
the views expressed may be unpopular.  But these 
“fundamental values” must also take into account 
consideration of the sensibilities of others, and, in the case of a 
school, the sensibilities of fellow students.  The undoubted 
freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in 
schools and classrooms must be balanced against the society’s 
countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of 
socially appropriate behavior.  Even the most heated political 
discourse in a democratic society requires consideration for the 
personal sensibilities of the other participants and 
audiences . . . . 
The process of educating our youth for citizenship in public 
schools is not confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics 
 
 36. Id. at 513. 
 37. William B. Senhauser, Note, Education and the Court: The Supreme 
Court’s Educational Ideology, 40 VAND. L. REV. 939, 941, 954–59, 977–80 (1987). 
 38. 478 U.S. 675 (1968). 
 39. Id. at 681 (quoting CHARLES BEARD & MARY BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY 
OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)). 
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class; schools must teach by example the shared values of a 
civilized social order.  Consciously or otherwise, teachers—and 
indeed the older students—demonstrate the appropriate form 
of civil discourse and political expression by their conduct and 
deportment in and out of class.40 
Two years later, in the 1988 school newspaper case Hazelwood 
School District v. Kuhlmeier,41 the Court quoted Fraser as part of 
the proposition that “[a] school must also retain the authority to 
refuse to sponsor student speech that might reasonably be perceived 
to advocate drug or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or conduct 
otherwise inconsistent with ‘the shared values of a civilized social 
order.’”42  “Otherwise,” the Court continued while quoting from 
Brown, “the schools would be unduly constrained from fulfilling 
their role as ‘a principal instrument in awakening the child to 
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and 
in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.’”43 
In all of these cases, the Court assumed a certain causal 
relationship—what we teach students, in a direct or indirect way, 
influences their behavior as adults; specifically, if we teach them to 
know and exercise their First Amendment rights, that will have a 
positive impact on the quality and quantity of public debate down 
the road.44  Bringing empirical research to bear on this specific 
proposition is difficult,45 although a couple of articles have made 
substantial contributions in this direction.  First, in 1991, Richard 
Roe engaged cognitive psychology research to argue that students 
 
 40. Id. at 681, 683. 
 41. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 42. Id. at 272 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683). 
 43. Id. (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).  Justice 
Brennan’s dissent also engaged the question of the role of schools as training 
citizens.  Id. at 277—78 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Richard Roe argues that 
“[t]he standards developed under Fraser and [Hazelwood v.] Kuhlmeier reflect a 
very different understanding of the ‘work of the schools’ and the ‘special 
characteristics of the school environment’ than does the Tinker standard.”  
Richard Roe, Valuing Student Speech: The Work of the Schools as Conceptual 
Development, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1269, 1288 (1991).  While I agree that Fraser 
and Hazelwood refine Tinker, I do not think they go so far as to present a 
fundamentally different view of the work that the First Amendment does in 
schools. 
 44. In Suzanna Sherry’s words, “The core of the claim that education is 
necessary to citizenship must instead be that education is necessary to the 
thoughtful or responsible exercise of citizenship rights.”  Suzanna Sherry, 
Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 131, 
132 (1995). 
 45. See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger 
Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422, 423 (1980); Norton, supra note 15, at 1275 n.48; 
Roe, supra note 43, at 1301, 1309; Brent T. White, Ritual, Emotion, and 
Political Belief: The Search for the Constitutional Limit to Patriotic Education 
in Public Schools, 43 GA. L. REV. 447, 454 (2009). 
W03_BOWMAN  (DO NOT DELETE) 6/19/2013  4:24 PM 
220 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48 
learn best through “an active process in which they construct, rather 
than receive, their knowledge and skills”—and that what is learned 
includes not only facts, but also “such skills as critical thinking and 
rational deliberation, which are essential to the exercise of civic 
responsibilities and individual rights.”46  Roe concluded that the 
First Amendment serves the general function in public schools 
assumed by the Court, although public schools have less ultimate 
influence than the Court implies because students “are not ‘empty 
vessels’ waiting passively to be filled by the school’s lessons.”47  
Second, Anne Dailey’s 2006 work engaged developmental psychology 
literature to argue that early family and caregiving relationships 
establish “the foundational processes of democratic citizenship,” 
while “[l]ater associations, most notably educational ones, will 
contribute to the development of democratic skills and values.”48  
Dailey, too, suggested that the Court’s assumptions about the role of 
schools in training citizens are generally correct, although these 
assumptions do not tell the whole story about how citizenship 
develops.49 
Another portion of the literature has engaged the question of 
what schools should teach about civic involvement by asking which 
definition of citizenship should dominate.50  Should schools teach, as 
Susanna Sherry argues, a civic republican model of citizenship in 
which students are taught to value political participation in their 
government by instilling this as a shared value of a common culture 
and a responsibility of individuals?51  Or, as Bruce Ackerman 
contends, does that approach prioritize conformity, and is a classic 
liberal approach preferred in which children and families have 
greater choice about their own values and individual as well as 
collective futures?52  Alternatively, does a liberal model 
insufficiently emphasize the collective, and should the focus be 
communitarianism, with the goal of assimilating children into the 
community, whether defined at the national or local level?53  But, 
 
 46. Roe, supra note 43, at 1343. 
 47. Id. at 1294, 1343–45, 1292–1301. 
 48. Dailey, supra note 22. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Helen Elizabeth Hartnell, Belonging: Citizenship and Migration in the 
European Union and in Germany, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 330, 344 n.74 (2006) 
(citing Rainer Bauböck, Recombinant Citizenship, POL. SCI. SERIES No. 67 
(1999)) (elaborating on the principle of thin versus thick conceptions of 
citizenship). 
 51. John Rhee, Theories of Citizenship and Their Role in the Bilingual 
Education Debate, 33 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 33, 47–50 (1999); Sherry, 
supra note 44, at 162–63. 
 52. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 139–67 
(1980); Rhee, supra note 51, at 50–52. 
 53. Rhee, supra note 51, at 52–57. 
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does a communitarian approach sufficiently prioritize public 
concerns such as governance?54  While it is beyond the scope of this 
Article to advocate for one of these approaches, I focus on one aspect 
that is common to, or at least consistent with, all of these 
approaches at a very general level: students’ ability to understand 
and exercise their First Amendment free speech rights.  Civic 
republicans and large communitarians would embrace this as part 
of what it means to be a citizen who adds value to society, engaging 
in public debate about important issues.55  Liberals would support 
this as educating students about how to advocate for various 
viewpoints, whether they challenge or support mainstream society 
and whether or not they are part of the political process per se.56  
Small communitarians, focused on creating identity based in local 
communities, would find this consistent with the goal of advocating 
for one’s community within the larger social context, although it 
would not be a high priority for them.57  While advocates prioritize 
different definitions of citizenship, none are willing to give up on 
schools’ contributions to the project of creating citizens. 
B. Ensuring the Creation of Citizens in a Constitutionally Sound 
Manner 
The discussion about creating a public good does not end with 
an evaluation of the ways in which education creates the next 
generation of citizens.  As one scholar notes, part of the theory of 
public goods is that ensuring that a public good is adequately 
provided is itself a public good.58  This Subpart examines how that 
latter public good, essentially the public good of enforcement, 
operates in the context of the creation of citizens in public schools. 
To begin with, consider the enforcement mechanism for 
ensuring educational quality.  In our current era of nationwide 
educational “accountability” focused on standards-based testing, 
public school districts regularly monitor the performance of their 
schools and publicly report about that performance.59  As part of this 
accountability system, government ensures that parents have access 
to information about the degree to which a basic education is 
provided in their children’s schools—and presumably parents can 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 50–52, 55. 
 56. Id. at 51. 
 57. Id. at 55–56. 
 58. Shaw, supra note 21, at 242 (“If the theory of public goods is correct, 
relatively few people are likely to spend time and resources making sure that 
someone else’s education (or health care or justice) is adequate.”). 
 59. Accountability, EDUC. WK. (Aug. 3, 2004), http://www.edweek.org 
/ew/issues/accountability.  For the primary present example of this, see No 
Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301–6578 (2006) (amending the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965). 
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try to move their children to other schools if dissatisfied with the 
current school (of course many practical barriers often prevent this).  
Related to this is the idea that competition from private and charter 
schools arguably helps ensure the quality of public education, as 
well.60  Additionally, the government arguably enforces quality in an 
admittedly imperfect way: federal and some state statutes subject 
low-performing schools to a series of escalating interventions.61  
Thus, part of the enforcement mechanism is operationalized by the 
state, and part by parents.  These enforcement mechanisms are not 
effective in creating quality education for all students, but even if 
they were, they focus only on the curriculum as traditionally 
defined, not on more abstract concepts such as students’ free speech 
rights.62 
Because states and school districts do not measure the extent to 
which various schools and school districts have an environment in 
which students’ speech flourishes or is stifled, there is no data for 
the government to use in administrative enforcement of students’ 
liberty interests, or for parents to create a comparison between 
particular public schools.63  So, because of a lack of data, 
government administrative enforcement is not enabled, and 
parental public choice enforcement is not viable, either.  
Furthermore, although private schools certainly may choose to let 
students engage in controversial speech, much like public schools 
themselves may grant students more speech rights than the 
constitutional floor requires, students have no constitutional free 
speech rights in private schools because those schools are not state 
actors.64  Thus, free speech is not incentivized by public schools 
competing with one another for students; private schools do not have 
 
 60. Shaw, supra note 21, at 251. 
 61. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301–6578. 
 62. U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
(2004) (discussing the focus on evaluating students’ reading and math). 
 63. Administrative enforcement is prevalent in other areas, such as racial 
and ethnic equity.  Consider Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which gives 
the U.S. Department of Education authority to investigate and negotiate 
compliance with school districts that deny students opportunities based on race.  
42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2006); see also Kristi L. Bowman, Pursuing Educational 
Opportunities for Latino/a Students, 88 N.C. L. REV. 911, 969–73 (2010) 
(discussing the importance of recordkeeping in the civil rights context). 
 64. Catherine LoTempio, Comment, It’s Time to Try Something New: Why 
Old Precedent Does Not Suit Charter Schools in the Search for State Actor 
Status, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 435, 446–53 (2012) (discussing courts’ 
inconsistent results about whether or not charter schools are state actors, and 
establishing that traditional private schools are not state actors); see also Mark 
G. Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of Government 
Expression and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REV. 863, 873–97 (1979) 
(discussing constitutional limits for public schools in providing aid to private 
religious schools). 
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to give students even the low level of speech protection available in 
public schools; and there is no standardized data that would support 
such a comparison even if it motivated parents to take action.65 
Thus, neither government oversight nor public or private 
competition does much, if anything, to create the public good of 
ensuring speech rights in schools.  To the extent that an 
enforcement mechanism exists, it occurs through two other avenues, 
one of which is the political process.  In the context of public schools, 
the political process refers to the election of school board members 
who create and amend district policies that establish the curriculum 
and limit individuals’ speech rights.66  These same school boards 
also ultimately hear appeals from principals’ decisions to suspend 
and expel students or discipline teachers, or make those decisions 
themselves.67  Because school board members are elected, 
presumably they can be voted out at the next election if they make 
decisions that fly in the face of widely shared community values 
about free speech or other matters.68  As a result, the political 
process is a substantial check on the speech-restrictive authority of 
school administrators—that is, unless the political process is 
distorted. 
At least as far back as 1938, in the famous footnote four of 
United States v. Carolene Products,69 the Court emphasized the 
special importance of judicial review when the political process is 
unable to provide a meaningful check on government action.70  This 
concern remains a strong one today, and thus judicial review is the 
second way liberty in schools is ensured, although one need not 
prove that the political process is distorted in order to access the 
courts.  In school speech cases, litigation is initiated by private 
parties, mainly students, parents, and teachers, who challenge the 
constitutionality of a school’s discipline or restriction of their speech.  
Plaintiffs who are prevailing parties can petition the court for fee 
shifting under § 1988, and in that way the federal government has 
removed a major disincentive to initiating constitutional litigation.71  
 
 65. Yudof, supra note 64, at 889 (discussing parental decisions in selecting 
a school district). 
 66. MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 938–48 (2011) 
(discussing the election of school board officials). 
 67. Id. at 325–406 (discussing student discipline); id. at 938–48 (discussing 
the election of school board officials). 
 68. See, e.g., Kristi L. Bowman, Seeing Government Purpose Through the 
Objective Observer’s Eyes: The Evolution-Intelligent Design Debates, 29 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 417, 420–21 (2006) (discussing the evolution-intelligent design 
controversy in Dover, Pennsylvania in 2005, and how the school board that 
adopted the controversial policy was voted out at the next election). 
 69. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 70. Id. at 152 n.4. 
 71. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012). 
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However, federal statutes incentivize other types of constitutional 
challenges even more, such as section 4 of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 that authorizes the Attorney General of the United States to 
bring litigation against individual school districts challenging racial 
discrimination in education.72  This is discussed more throughout 
Parts III and IV.  Nonetheless, the availability of litigation remains 
the backstop when seeking to ensure that the creation of citizens is 
accomplished in a constitutionally sound manner.  
In sum, schools are unique institutions because education is a 
private and public good that, the Court assumes, creates positive 
externalities of general economic and civic benefits.  Ensuring the 
constitutionally sound creation of these civic benefits is an 
independent public good that is created through the political and 
also the judicial processes, not through public or private competition 
or through government administrative enforcement.  Based on these 
understandings, the rest of this Article considers the relationship 
between the changes the government speech doctrine would impose 
on speech in schools and the need to maintain both the public good 
of creating citizens, and the public good of ensuring that process of 
creation is constitutionally sound. 
II.  THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE 
The government speech doctrine took root in a doctrinal 
landscape in which the forum analysis doctrine and the general 
presumption against viewpoint discrimination already existed.  
However, at least vis-à-vis those two concepts, the government 
speech doctrine is somewhat like intellectual kudzu, climbing on the 
existing framework and perhaps eventually covering it up entirely.  
At this point, the doctrine still contains many open questions, 
including whether it should apply in school speech cases. 
A. The Doctrine Emerges 
The story of the government speech doctrine begins with the 
forum analysis doctrine, which focuses on determining when 
members of the public can use government property to communicate 
their own messages.73  Specifically, if a forum is “public”—
traditionally open for public expression, protest, et cetera—then the 
government’s regulation of the property must be minimal, whereas 
if the forum is “nonpublic”—generally not open to the public for 
expressive purposes—then the government may impose more 
 
 72. Id. § 2000c-6(a); Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 407, 409–10, 
78 Stat. 248–49. 
 73. Bezanson, supra note 18, at 809–10; Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 
91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 1979–94 (2011). 
W03_BOWMAN  (DO NOT DELETE) 6/19/2013  4:24 PM 
2013] SPEECH IN SCHOOLS 225 
stringent regulations on the private speech occurring there.74  
“Limited” or “designated” public fora fall somewhere in the middle 
both in terms of the openness of the property and the restrictions 
the government may impose on private speech in those contexts.75 
The forum analysis doctrine emerged during the mid-twentieth 
century76 and gained heft during the 1960s and 1970s.77  As Robert 
Post has described, forum analysis was a “fundamental principle of 
First Amendment doctrine” by the mid-1980s.78  As the forum 
analysis doctrine was coming into its own, notable First Amendment 
scholars including Steven Shiffrin, Laurence Tribe, and Mark Yudof 
began writing about the theoretical and practical problems 
presented when the government was not a neutral arbiter of speech 
in a forum, but rather was the speaker itself.79  Some of these 
problems already had presented themselves to lower courts, but 
most of the prominent government speech cases were yet to come.  It 
was not until 1991, when the Supreme Court decided Rust v. 
Sullivan,80 that the contemporary government speech doctrine 
started to emerge in what is, in retrospect, a now-recognizable form.  
In Rust, the Court held that Congress could require that federal 
funds not be used “in programs where abortion is a method of family 
planning” because “[t]he Government can, without violating the 
Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain 
activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same 
time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the 
problem in another way.”81  The Court continued, “[i]n so doing, the 
 
 74. Blocher, supra note 10, at 43–44; Robert C. Post, Between Governance 
and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. 
REV. 1713, 1715 (1987). 
 75. Blocher, supra note 10, at 45; Post, supra note 74, at 1745–46. 
 76. See, e.g., Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
 77. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976); Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. 
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 547 (1975); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 
298, 302–03 (1974); Amalgamated Food Emps. v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 
U.S. 308, 315 (1968); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965). 
 78. Post, supra note 74, at 1714; see, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal 
Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. 
Perry Local Educators Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983); Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for 
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 655 (1981); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 
U.S. 263, 267–69 (1981). 
 79. Steven Shiffrin was the first scholar to draw together various cases as 
presenting some sort of government speech “doctrine,” but his definition in 1980 
was more broad than the Supreme Court’s cases would bear out over the thirty 
years that followed it.  Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 
565 passim (1980); see also Robert D. Kamenshine, The First Amendment’s 
Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1104 (1979); Laurence 
Tribe, Toward a Metatheory of Free Speech, 10 SW. U. L. REV. 237 (1978); Yudof, 
supra note 64. 
 80. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 81. Id. at 178, 193. 
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Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has 
merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.”82 
In the ten years following Rust, the Court issued a handful of 
cases that we now identify as the core building blocks of the 
government speech doctrine.83  In contrast to the forum analysis 
doctrine, which creates individual rights and thus regulates the 
government’s behavior when it is the neutral arbiter of a forum, the 
government speech doctrine gives the government an absolute 
defense to an individual’s free speech claim when the government 
can claim that the individual’s speech attempts to alter the 
government’s message.84  In 2001, at the end of the decade after 
Rust, Randall Bezanson and William Buss described the 
government speech doctrine as follows: 
The [government speech] cases may reflect a new and 
theoretically fundamental development in First Amendment 
jurisprudence on which a working majority of the Court has 
yet to form, a transformative idea of the First Amendment and 
the relationship between modern, complex government and the 
 
 82. Id. at 193. 
 83. Helen Norton & Danielle Keats Citron, Government Speech 2.0, 87 
DENV. U. L. REV. 899, 905 (2010) (explaining that Rust does not use the term 
“government speech,” but over the decade that followed, Rust came to represent 
an idea against which the Court contrasted other situations in which speech 
regulations were impermissible).  In 2009, the Court described the central 
principles of the doctrine, and in doing so provided also a history of the 
development of the doctrine: 
If petitioners were engaging in their own expressive conduct, then the 
Free Speech Clause has no application.  The Free Speech Clause 
restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate 
government speech.  See Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Assn., 544 U.S. 
550, 553, 125 S.Ct. 2055, 161 L.Ed.2d 896 (2005) (“[T]he Government’s 
own speech . . . is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny”); Columbia 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 
94, 139, n.7, 93 S.Ct. 2080, 36 L.Ed.2d 772 (1973) (Stewart, J., 
concurring) (“Government is not restrained by the First Amendment 
from controlling its own expression”).  A government entity has the right 
to “speak for itself.”  Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. 
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229, 120 S.Ct. 1346, 146 L.Ed.2d 193 (2000).  
“[I]t is entitled to say what it wishes,” Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors 
of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 
(1995), and to select the views that it wants to express. See Rust v. 
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194, 111 S.Ct. 1759, 114 L.Ed.2d 233 (1991); 
National Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598, 118 S.Ct. 
2168, 141 L.Ed.2d 500 (1998) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment) (“It 
is the very business of government to favor and disfavor points of view”). 
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2009).  See also 
Blocher, supra note 10, at 21–25, for Joseph Blocher’s summary of the 
development of the doctrine during this time period. 
 84. Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. 
L. REV. 695, 698–99 (2011). 
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polity it serves.  This is a view of government as initiator, 
persuader, educator, shaper of culture and beliefs, and molder 
of consensus.  
But to us the cases reflect something less than this, something 
more ambiguous or, at least, more inchoate.  They look more 
like an experiment borne of felt necessity on the one hand, and 
theoretical confusion on the other hand, tried out gingerly on a 
case-by-case basis.  At the very least, the cases reflect a 
doctrinal development that is far from complete.  Virtually all 
of the opinions have left room for later interpretation on 
alternative grounds.85 
In the decade since Bezanson and Buss wrote those words, the 
main contours of the doctrine have remained the same.  Two trends 
have dominated the Court’s engagement with these issues over the 
past decade.  First, the many remaining open questions about the 
doctrine suggest that the Court has continued to “operat[e] on an 
intuitive, even inchoate, sense of what government speech is.”86  
Second, the government speech doctrine appears to be assuming the 
previously dominant place of the forum analysis doctrine, and these 
two doctrines (government speech and forum analysis) continue to 
be viewed as a binary.87 
 
 85. Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of 
Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1509 (2001). 
 86. Id. at 1436.  Writing nearly a decade later, Steven Gey described the 
doctrine as incredibly sloppy at best, and in fact so incoherent that it makes the 
most sense if it is ideologically driven, rather than doctrinally driven.  Steven G. 
Gey, Why Should the First Amendment Protect Government Speech When the 
Government Has Nothing to Say?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1259, 1264, 1269 (2010).  He 
summarizes the doctrine as follows: 
Government subsidies for private speakers sometimes constitute 
government speech (Rust), except when the Court chooses to treat those 
accepting the government subsidies as private speakers (Velazquez), or 
when the government-funded speaker is participating in a legal medium 
of expression that limits government speech that affects the way courts 
do their business (Velazquez), except when the Court decides that 
imposing limits on government-funded speakers in the legal medium of 
expression is just fine (Garcetti).  The Court’s distinctions are either 
nonexistent . . . or utterly baffling . . . . 
Id. at 1286.  The placement of this doctrine in a constitutional law textbook 
belies some of the substantial questions about the doctrine.  One leading 
textbook, by Erwin Chemerinsky, places Summum under “B.  Free Speech 
Methodology, 1.  The Distinction Between Content-Based and Content-Neutral 
Laws, c.  Problems in Applying the Distinction Between Content-Based and 
Content-Neutral Laws (Pleasant Grove v. Summum).”  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2009). 
 87. Andy G. Olree, Identifying Government Speech, 42 CONN. L. REV. 365, 
379 (2009) (discussing how Supreme Court cases assume a binary approach, 
while others recognize a “hybrid” or “mixed” speech category “unrecognized thus 
far by the Supreme Court”); Daniel W. Park, Government Speech and the Public 
Forum: A Clash Between Democratic and Egalitarian Values, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 
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Both of these trends are present in the Court’s most recent 
government speech decision, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum.88  In 
that case, the Summum, a religious group, sought to donate a 
monument to the city for a park in which eleven of the fifteen 
monuments had been donated.89  After their offer was rejected, the 
Summum sued.90  They claimed that the city’s rejection of their 
monument after accepting so many others constituted viewpoint 
discrimination that violated their free speech rights, and they 
sought a preliminary injunction to force the city to accept and install 
their monument.91  The district court rejected the Summums’ claim, 
but the Tenth Circuit reversed, concluding that in a public forum 
such as a park, the government’s restriction must survive strict 
scrutiny.92 
The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit, with seven 
Justices joining Justice Alito’s majority opinion and Justice Souter 
concurring in the judgment.93  No Justices dissented.  The Court 
held that the park, while “a traditional public forum for speeches 
and other transitory expressive acts,” was not a public forum for the 
purpose of permanent display of monuments.94  It further clarified 
that “[t]he forum doctrine has been applied in situations in which 
government-owned property or a government program was capable 
of accommodating a large number of public speakers without 
defeating the essential function of the land or the program.”95  While 
a park can accommodate an incredible number of orators—especially 
over the course of years—the same park can only accommodate a 
limited number of monuments, especially if it is to retain any of the 
open area that makes it useful as a gathering space.96  Thus, the 
Court held that the city was not acting as a neutral arbiter of a 
forum when it decided which monuments to accept, but rather was 
 
113, 132 (2009).  Scholars propose various nuanced ways of understanding the 
distinction between these two categories.  One approach is to ask whether the 
government is the patron of speech (government speech doctrine), or the 
regulator of speech (forum analysis).  Josh Davis & Josh Rosenberg, 
Government as Patron or Regulator in the Student Speech Cases, 83 ST. JOHN’S 
L. REV. 1047, 1051 (2009).  Another way of understanding the difference is to 
ask whether the court’s analysis turns on the speaker’s identity (government 
speech doctrine) or on the location of the speech (forum analysis).  Blocher, 
supra note 10, at 2, 20, 42; see also Joseph Blocher, Government Property and 
Government Speech, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1413, 1416–17 (2011). 
 88. Summum, 555 U.S. at 46366. 
 89. Id. at 464. 
 90. Id. at 466. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 462, 485. 
 94. Id. at 464. 
 95. Id. at 478. 
 96. Id. 
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acting as a speaker.97  This is important because, in the Court’s 
words, “[t]he Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of 
private speech; it does not regulate government speech.”98  Stated 
differently, a private speaker cannot use the Free Speech Clause to 
force the government to express a message the government does not 
want to convey.  According to the Court in Summum, the only clear 
limits of the government speech doctrine are the Establishment 
Clause and also “limit[ing] . . . law, regulation, or practice.”99 
These core principles lead naturally to one somewhat surprising 
doctrinal change and also create a few important open questions.  
The surprising change is this: in Summum, the Court acknowledged 
the “legitimate concern that the government speech doctrine not be 
used as a subterfuge for favoring certain private speakers over 
others based on viewpoint.”100  However, the Court did not address 
that concern in detail.101  The presumption that the government 
 
 97. Id. at 481. 
 98. Id. at 467. 
 99. Id. at 468.  First, in his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice 
Souter expressed great concern about the need to clarify the relationship 
between the Establishment Clause and the government speech doctrine.  Id. at 
485–86 (Souter, J., concurring).  The relationship is complicated: if Pleasant 
Grove had accepted the Summum’s monument and thus adopted the monument 
as government speech, the city arguably could have been liable for violating the 
Establishment Clause.  See Bowman, supra note 68, at 423–24 (analyzing Van 
Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) and McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 
(2005)). 
  Second, what is included in “limit[ing] . . . law, regulation, or practice” 
is as yet unknown.  Helen Norton argues that the Equal Protection Clause 
prohibits the use of the government speech doctrine to shield the government 
from liability for hate speech.  Helen Norton, The Equal Protection Implications 
of Government’s Hateful Speech, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 159 passim (2012); see 
also Jennifer S. Hendricks & Dawn Marie Howerton, Teaching Values, 
Teaching Stereotypes: Sex Education and Indoctrination in Public Schools, 13 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 587, 626–35 (2011) (tracing different approaches in scholarly 
literature on the imposition of values in public schools).  See generally, David W. 
Burcham, School Desegregation and the First Amendment, 59 ALB. L. REV. 213 
(1995) (discussing the relationship between school desegregation and the 
inculcation of racial values in schools); Stephen Arons & Charles Lawrence III, 
The Manipulation of Consciousness: A First Amendment Critique of Schooling, 
15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 309 (1980) (exploring the relationship between 
freedom of speech and the imposition of values in schools).  Additionally, 
William Thro suggests that if a government contract constitutes government 
speech (which seems likely given the broad scope of the actions that the Court 
has included as government speech), Board of County Commissioners v. 
Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996), may limit government speech because it prohibits 
the government from retaliatory nonrenewal of a contract with a party who was 
critical of the government, and also that state constitutional law may limit 
government speech.  E-mail from William Thro to author (Aug. 21, 2012) (on file 
with author). 
 100. Summum, 555 U.S. at 473. 
 101. See id. 
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cannot discriminate among speakers’ viewpoints has long been a 
foundational aspect of First Amendment law, and it is one of the few 
First Amendment principles on which a range of scholars agree.102  
In a practical sense, it appears that the ultimate effect of this 
presumption is weakening because it is easier for the state to invoke 
the government speech doctrine if the speech at issue expresses a 
strong viewpoint.  As Joseph Blocher explains, “to prevail in a 
government speech case[, the government] is to show that a private 
speaker’s message is contrary to, and interfering with, its own 
[message].  Under government speech doctrine, however, one can 
avoid First Amendment scrutiny altogether by embracing the fact 
that a regulation is viewpoint specific.”103 
To those who litigate and write about free speech in the unique 
context of public schools, practical limitations on the presumption 
against viewpoint discrimination are perhaps not as shocking 
because de facto viewpoint discrimination is necessarily a part of the 
educational process.104  Schools often present various viewpoints 
about a given issue, but they simply do not have time to instruct 
students about all viewpoints on a given subject.105  Furthermore, 
even if presenting all viewpoints were possible, complete neutrality 
is not the goal of the government-as-educator or the goal of most 
parents who enroll their children in public schools; for example, 
neither states, schools, nor the vast majority of parents in the 
United States probably want students to learn that holocaust 
deniers’ viewpoint is as valid as mainstream historians’.  Finally, as 
scholars have argued, myself among them, some viewpoint 
discrimination already is a part of regulating students’ speech in 
schools under the Court’s seminal student free speech cases.106  This 
 
 102. Blocher, supra note 84, at 696 (“The prevention of viewpoint 
discrimination has long been considered the central concern of the First 
Amendment, and yet in some cases government speech doctrine seems to 
allow—if not outright encourage—viewpoint discrimination in the extreme.”); 
see also Bezanson & Buss, supra note 85, at 1377. 
 103. Blocher, supra note 84, at 716. 
 104. As Randall Bezanson and William Buss have eloquently stated, 
“viewpoint discrimination is inextricably a part of education.  One cannot 
communicate the messages involved in an educational process without 
exercising choice—without choosing some messages and not others; and without 
making these choices on the basis of the content of the available alternatives.”  
Bezanson & Buss, supra note 85, at 1420; see also Brownstein, supra note 10, at 
737–38, 813–16; Lee Goldman, Student Speech and the First Amendment: A 
Comprehensive Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 395, 420–21 (2011). 
 105. Norton, supra note 15, at 1276–77. 
 106. See generally Kristi L. Bowman, Public School Students’ Religious 
Speech and Viewpoint Discrimination, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 187 (2007); Douglas 
Laycock, High-Value Speech and the Basic Educational Mission of a Public 
School: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 111 (2008); John 
E. Taylor, Tinker and Viewpoint Discrimination, 77 UMKC L. REV. 569 (2009); 
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is not to say that schools are free to discriminate against viewpoints 
arbitrarily or maliciously, even independent of the government 
speech doctrine, but rather that the presumption against viewpoint 
discrimination has never been as strong inside the schoolhouse 
gates as it has been outside of them.  This is important to remember 
when considering the impact the government speech doctrine would 
have on school speech cases. 
B. Open Questions in the Government Speech Doctrine 
Because the purpose of this Article is to apply the government 
speech doctrine in a unique institutional context and critique the 
results of that application rather than to critique the doctrine more 
generally, I have presented a relatively brief and straightforward 
summary of the government speech doctrine.  However, it is also 
important to discuss some of the most significant open questions 
regarding this doctrine because these vagaries will influence how 
the doctrine would play out in the public school context, and also 
whether it should apply there.107  This Subpart engages three 
leading open questions that cut across all potential applications of 
the government speech doctrine. 
1. How Do We Know that the Government Is Speaking? 
It may seem as though it should be clear when the government 
is speaking, but in fact the Court’s government speech cases have 
created an incredible amount of confusion about how obvious the 
government’s connection to speech must be in order for the 
government to invoke the government speech doctrine as a 
defense.108  This confusion is not new: in Rust v. Sullivan, which is 
commonly described as the first major government speech case, the 
government regulated what doctors could say to patients in family 
planning programs via a Spending Clause restriction—but there 
was no reason to suspect that the patients receiving the medical 
services understood that a government regulation was influencing 
the medical advice they received.109  The government speaks 
through its policies, through its agents, through permanent 
displays—and the fact that individuals have a role in creating the 
 
Emily Gold Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood’s Core: A New Approach to 
Restrictions on School-Sponsored Speech, 60 FLA. L. REV. 63 (2008). 
 107. See infra Parts II–III; see also Bezanson & Buss, supra note 85, at 
1382–83 (summarizing the many open questions about the government speech 
doctrine in 2001, most of which remain unanswered today). 
 108. Blocher, supra note 10, at 26. 
 109. Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying 
Expression’s Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 629–30 (2008). 
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speech does not automatically give the state and the individual a 
claim to the speech.110 
So how do courts determine whether speech is the 
government’s?  This question is a common one courts confront when 
analyzing an Establishment Clause challenge, and as noted above, 
Establishment Clause cases are a subset of government speech 
cases.111  However, the answer to the question “is the government 
speaking?” has very different consequences in an Establishment 
Clause case and in a non-Establishment Clause case such as a Free 
Speech case: If the government is speaking in an Establishment 
Clause case, then it can be liable for a constitutional violation, 
whereas if the government is speaking in a Free Speech case, then it 
is generally immune from liability.112  Courts’ determinations of 
whether the government is speaking also differ in Establishment 
Clause and Free Speech Clause cases.  In the latter, several circuits 
determine whether the speech belongs to the government or to a 
private individual by analyzing the following factors: 
(1) the central ‘purpose’ of the program in which the speech in 
question occurs; (2) the degree of ‘editorial control’ exercised by 
the government or private entities over the content of the 
speech; (3) the identity of the ‘literal speaker’; and (4) whether 
the government or the private entity bears the ‘ultimate 
responsibility’ for the content of the speech . . . .113 
Scholars have suggested that this multifactor test belies a high 
level of confusion about the doctrine114 and also that it conceals 
some circuits’ resistance to the doctrine.115  Some have proposed 
alternative tests that vary in their specifics, but mostly seem to 
focus on the government’s intent as the speaker and the effect of the 
 
 110. YUDOF, supra note 10, at 42–50; Leora Harpaz, School Speech: Whose 
Speech Is It Anyway and Why Does the First Amendment Care?,  
6TH COMMONWEALTH ED. L. CONF. 69, 69–70 (2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1972270; Lidsky, supra note 
73, at 1992. 
 111. Claudia E. Haupt, Mixed Public-Private Speech and the Establishment 
Clause, 85 TUL. L. REV. 571, 586–87 (2011). 
 112. Olree, supra note 87; see also Blocher, supra note 10, at 50–51 
(describing differences between the government speech analysis and the 
commercial speech analysis). 
 113. Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 964 (9th Cir. 2008); see 
also Lilia Lim, Four-Factor Disaster: Courts Should Abandon the Circuit Test 
for Distinguishing Government Speech from Private Speech, 83 WASH. L. REV. 
569, 570 (2008); Norton & Citron, supra note 83, at 917. 
 114. See, e.g., Gey, supra note 86, at 1304. 
 115. Norton & Citron, supra note 83, at 916–17. 
W03_BOWMAN  (DO NOT DELETE) 6/19/2013  4:24 PM 
2013] SPEECH IN SCHOOLS 233 
speech as measured by the recipient’s perception of the speech.116  
Many of these proposals share a common focus with the “reasonable 
observer” test from the Court’s Establishment Clause doctrine, and 
some would apply in both Establishment Clause and Free Speech 
Clause determinations about who is speaking.117 
Scholars also argue that if the government is permitted to 
employ the government speech doctrine, the government’s identity 
as speaker should be clear.  This is not only to resolve ambiguity in 
the doctrine118 but also for normative reasons: when citizens know 
the government is speaking, they can better evaluate the message 
because they know its origin and also hold the government 
accountable for expressing that viewpoint in various ways, including 
the political context.119  These considerations weigh heavily in the 
public school context because of one of the central purposes of public 
education: to create the next generation of citizens who share a 
common core of knowledge and values, including knowledge and 
values that perpetuate democracy.  As discussed earlier, education 
is not value or viewpoint neutral, and, for practical as well as 
normative reasons, it will never be.  Thus, both transparency of 
speaker and transparency of message arguably are especially 
important in the context of public schools, if government is to be 
accountable for the values and viewpoints it advocates.120  
 
 116. Norton, supra note 109, at 599, 604–05, 610, 612–13 (summarizing 
various scholars’ proposals); Norton & Citron, supra note 83, at 917; Olree, 
supra note 87. 
 117. Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 
HASTINGS L.J. 983, 1052–55 (2005).  For a summary of the development of the 
“reasonable observer” test in the Establishment Clause context, see Bowman, 
supra note 68, at 445–61; Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is 
Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 608 (2008); Olree, supra 
note 87. 
 118. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 566–67 (2005) 
(upholding a federal statutory requirement that beef producers be required to 
pay into a fund for generic beef advertisements as permissible compelled 
funding of government speech). 
 119. Lee, supra note 117, at 988–89; Helen Norton, Constraining Public 
Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its Workers’ Speech to Protect Its 
Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 27 (2009); Norton & Citron, supra note 83, at 
902; see also Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009). 
 120. Gia Lee distills social science research about the many factors that 
influence the impact of speech, whether belonging to the government or to a 
private speaker.  See Lee, supra note 117, at 994–1004 (“The implicit 
assumption in contemporary Supreme Court doctrine is that the public 
approaches government communications as message-focused evaluators. . . .  By 
contrast, much of the legal scholarship takes a rather dim view of people’s 
abilities to evaluate or resist governmental messages. . . .  A related, although 
less extreme, conception envisions the public as made up of not passive 
recipients, but rather vulnerable recipients. . . .  Rather . . . the ways in which 
people process and respond to all messages, including those emanating from the 
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Reasonable adult observers in the community are also likely to 
understand that the government is controlling the content of that 
communication, and sometimes courts assume that students 
vaguely understand this, as well.121 
At the same time, although a good deal of the government’s 
speech in schools (curriculum, instruction, et cetera) will fairly 
clearly belong to the government, there is also the possibility that 
the government, by controlling what is taught in schools, distorts 
the public’s ability to provide an effective check on government 
speech through the political process.  Many government speech 
scholars emphasize the importance of the political process check on 
government speech,122 and yet the potential problem of distortion in 
the political process is not often raised—probably because the type 
of distortion that can occur through public schools is in many ways 
unique, potentially very powerful, and also difficult to measure with 
any degree of specificity as discussed earlier.123 
2. What If the Speech Is Governmental and Private? 
Some of this Article is focused on speech that appears, at least 
at first, to involve both a governmental speaker and a private 
speaker—the state and a teacher, the state and a student, or the 
state and a group of students.  Courts and commentators regularly 
assume that speech is either private or governmental and cannot be 
both at the same time, but this binary does not reflect the reality of 
much school speech.124  Caroline Mala Corbin has analyzed “mixed” 
speech, that which is both public and private, in great and 
thoughtful detail.  Corbin provides a helpful way to think about 
speech in this category: “[M]uch speech is the joint production of 
both the government and private speakers and exists somewhere 
along a continuum, with pure private speech and pure government 
speech at each end.”125  A common example of mixed speech is the 
specialty license plate, where a state permits an organization to 
 
government, turn on a complex interplay of a variety of factors, including 
message, speaker, recipient, and context; none of those factors alone is 
necessarily controlling.”). 
 121. Brownstein, supra note 10, at 768 (“Courts typically conclude that 
young children in elementary school are particularly likely to believe that any 
expressive activity in their classes or during an assembly is approved by 
teachers and administrators.”); White, supra note 45, at 492 (discussing this 
issue in the Pledge of Allegiance context). 
 122. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 117, at 989; Norton, supra note 119; Norton & 
Citron, supra note 83, at 902; see also Summum, 555 U.S. at 468–69. 
 123. See White, supra note 45, at 492. 
 124. As Lyrissa Lidsky notes, the public-private binary is a “false choice.”  
Lidsky, supra note 73, at 2011–12; see also Blocher, supra note 84, at 711; 
Corbin, supra note 117. 
 125. Corbin, supra note 117, at 607. 
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print a message on the plate and vehicle owners can elect to 
purchase a plate with that particular message.126  As Corbin 
documents while analyzing that example and others, circuits are 
split about whether to classify the mixed speech as private or 
governmental.127  This classification is incredibly important and in 
many cases outcome-determinative: if the speech is the 
government’s, then the government may choose what message it 
wants to convey (for example, a pro-choice or pro-life message) and 
is not required to give voice to the contrary viewpoint.  If the speech 
is private speech, then the traditional presumption against 
viewpoint discrimination applies and the individual has some 
speech rights, as opposed to none. 
As only a few federal judges have even flirted with the idea of 
an official mixed speech category, the governmental/private speech 
binary remains good law.128  Yet, as Corbin explains, there are 
substantial pitfalls of classifying mixed speech into only one of these 
two categories: 
[I]f mixed speech is categorized as private speech, the 
government cannot discriminate against any viewpoints.  
Consequently, discounting the government component of 
mixed speech may lead to government endorsement of 
undesirable messages (like offensive or hate speech) or 
government endorsement of religious messages in violation of 
the establishment clause. . . .  [I]f mixed speech is categorized 
as government speech, the government may censor viewpoints.  
Viewpoint discrimination, however, may undermine the free 
speech interests of both speakers and audiences and distort 
the marketplace of ideas.  Furthermore . . . the government’s 
chosen viewpoint could be mistaken for private preferences.  
The resulting lack of transparency permits the government to 
advance its policy positions without being held accountable for 
its advocacy.129 
Similar to the situations Corbin analyzes, much speech in 
schools does not easily fall into one category or the other: students’ 
public curricular speech and students’ speech at school assemblies 
are commonplace examples of mixed speech in schools.130  Supreme 
 
 126. Id.; see also Norton, supra note 109, at 590. 
 127. Corbin, supra note 117, at 607; see also Norton, supra note 109, at 590–
91; Olree, supra note 87, at 386–400. 
 128. Olree, supra note 87, at 386; see also Helen Norton, Not for Attribution: 
Government’s Interest in Protecting the Integrity of Its Own Expression, 37 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1317, 1329–31 (2004). 
 129. Corbin, supra note 117, at 610. 
 130. Alan Brownstein contends that “[t]here are many occasions where 
student speech in school-sponsored activities cannot reasonably be understood 
to express the government’s message.”  Brownstein, supra note 10, at 736.  
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Court cases have engaged others: a nondenominational prayer 
offered by an invited clergyperson at a school graduation,131 a pre-
football game prayer conveyed over the stadium PA system by a 
student elected by his or her peers,132 and a student’s lewd speech 
discussed ahead of time with two teachers and delivered at a school 
assembly.133  The Court treated the speech in the first two of these 
three instances as the government’s and in the last instance as the 
individual’s.134 
If a court were to explicitly recognize these situations as 
involving mixed speech, this recognition would more accurately 
describe the speech itself.  Additionally, abandoning the legal fiction 
that speech is either governmental or private in this context would 
lead to many of the benefits and avoid many of the pitfalls Corbin 
describes.  However, doing so also would require the use of a 
different legal test.  As I discuss in more detail in Subpart IV.B, 
though, in the public school setting the Hazelwood test and existing 
Establishment Clause doctrine address these concerns in a way that 
may not be ideal, but is adequate. 
3. How Unambiguous Must the Government’s Message Be? 
One last open question in government speech doctrine is how 
unambiguous the government’s message must be in order for the 
government to invoke the doctrine as a defense to quashing private 
free speech rights.  This issue, too, is present in many school speech 
situations.  The Supreme Court has recognized government speech 
as both affirmative (promoting a particular message) and negative 
(refusing to adopt a private speaker’s message);135 accordingly, this 
recognition has created substantial ambiguity in the doctrine.  For 
example, in Summum, the city did not want to accept the 
Summums’ monument, and the Court held that it did not have to 
because the city could not be forced to convey a message it did not 
want to adopt.136  But what message was the city intending to 
send—and what message was a reasonable observer in that 
community absorbing—when the city accepted the other monuments 
for the city park and rejected the Summums’?  Does exclusion 
express disapproval of the speaker?  Does inclusion express 
approval?  If so, are these general messages specific enough to 
 
However, it appears that Brownstein reaches this conclusion within the public-
private speech dichotomy rather than evaluating the speech as mixed speech. 
 131. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 581 (1992). 
 132. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294 (2000). 
 133. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677–78 (1986). 
 134. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 302–03; Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 
403, 478 U.S. at 685–86; Weisman, 505 U.S. at 586. 
 135. Norton, supra note 128, at 1320–21. 
 136. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 479–81 (2009). 
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constitute a government viewpoint?  And, in other situations, how 
would the public know that the exclusion was not based on 
aesthetics? 
Furthermore, what if multiple messages are conveyed by one 
speech act—does this reduce the impression that the government is 
speaking or that it is conveying a particular viewpoint and thus 
allowed to exclude contrary viewpoints?137  If we consider school 
curriculum, over the course of just one day students are exposed to 
countless messages, sometimes about the same issue.  Similarly, 
when a school building (or stadium, gymnasium, library, classroom, 
et cetera) is named for an individual or for a sponsor, what message 
is communicated?138  Joseph Blocher asks: “Does the name on a 
school really send a message of endorsement?  Or is it simply the 
equivalent of allowing a private sponsor to use the school as a 
billboard?  If it is the latter, is that acquiescence enough to 
constitute an endorsement?”139  If the government is conveying 
multiple messages, the government speech doctrine seems to give 
the government a wide berth to quash a broad range of “contrary” 
speech without suffering constitutional consequences.140 
C. Why the Government Speech Doctrine Could Apply in School 
Speech Cases 
As the Supreme Court regularly reminds us, public schools are 
unique First Amendment institutions—in other words, the Free 
Speech Clause rules are different inside the schoolhouse gates.141  
Thus, it is not a foregone conclusion that the government speech 
doctrine would apply in this context.  In fact, the most obvious way 
to distinguish away the government speech doctrine in school speech 
cases would be to rely on the binary formed by the government 
speech doctrine and forum analysis doctrine, and resolve school 
speech cases under the forum analysis approach.  After all, the 
 
 137. Norton, supra note 109, at 615. 
 138. Blocher, supra note 10, at 27. 
 139. Id. at 29. 
 140. Park, supra note 87 (“If the government exercises approval authority in 
creating a message (Summum, Johanns), the government can pick and choose 
among private speakers that it will support based on vague criteria such as the 
speaker’s ‘excellence,’ ‘decency’ or ‘respectfulness’ (Finley), the government can 
exercise editorial discretion based on what it determines to be newsworthy 
(Forbes), or exercise judgment about what information is best for research or 
learning (American Library Ass’n).  These broad criteria are extremely flexible 
and adaptable to new circumstances.”). 
 141. See supra Part I.A; see also Scott A. Moss, The Overhyped Path from 
Tinker to Morse: How the Student Speech Cases Show the Limits of Supreme 
Court Decisions—For the Law and for the Litigants, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1407, 1436–
38 (2011) (summarizing and discussing the academic debate about the 
uniqueness of schools as First Amendment institutions). 
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Court resolved the two most recent higher education student speech 
cases with forum analysis reasoning, while specifically rejecting the 
government speech doctrine, even though the speech was arguably 
at least partially that of the school.142  Those two cases, however, do 
not transfer to the elementary/secondary school context.  First, they 
both involve student organizations speaking outside of classroom 
settings and thus are not a good factual fit for most of the school 
speech conflicts.  Second and even more importantly, despite the 
Court’s flirtation with forum analysis in a public school setting in 
Hazelwood, courts have consistently held that elementary and 
secondary school classrooms are not public fora or even designated/ 
limited fora.143  Thus, although forum analysis may have some 
utility in elementary and secondary schools, it is inadequate to 
address the incredible range of speech controversies that occur 
there.144 
 
 142. In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 
decided in 1995, the Court held that when a university provided funding and 
space for student organizations, it created a forum in which it could only impose 
viewpoint-neutral regulations, and that it did not violate the Establishment 
Clause because some of the organizations were religious in nature.  515 U.S. 
819, 830, 834, 845–46 (1995).  Additionally, the Court made it clear that by 
providing funding and meeting space, the university was not speaking directly 
or adopting a private message as its own.  Id. at 834.  This was true even when 
an organization used the funding to print a religious publication in accordance 
with its mission—unlike the school newspaper in Hazelwood, the student 
organization publication at issue here did not bear the imprimatur of the school.  
Id. at 841. 
  Similarly, in 2000, the Court held in Board of Regents of University of 
Wisconsin System v. Southworth that a university could assess a mandatory 
student activity fee even over the opposition of some students who did not want 
to financially support all student organizations, so long as the fee was disbursed 
in a viewpoint-neutral manner.  529 U.S. 217, 220–21 (2000).  As in 
Rosenberger, the Court made clear that Southworth was a public forum case, 
not a government speech case.  Id. at 229–30. 
 143. Brownstein, supra note 10, at 730–34.  Indeed, it is difficult to conceive 
of how teachers could make their way through lesson plans, much less grade 
assignments or satisfy the state standards, if they had to be receptive to 
whatever views students, parents, or community members wanted expressed in 
schools.  For these reasons and others, I find Alan Brownstein’s “nonforum” 
argument quite compelling.  In short, he proposes that public elementary and 
secondary schools are one example of what should be recognized as a new 
category in forum analysis—the “nonforum”—which is unique because the 
purposes of the government property and activity (here, the school and 
education, respectively) are inconsistent with protecting the free speech rights 
of many individuals on that property and involved in that activity.  Id. at 770–
75. 
 144. William G. Buss, Academic Freedom and Freedom of Speech: 
Communicating the Curriculum, 2 J. GEN. RACE & JUST. 213, 251 n.220 (1999) 
(citing Burnham v. Ianni, 98 F.3d 1007 (8th Cir. 1996); Blum v. Schlegel, 18 
F.3d 1005, 1012 (2d Cir. 1994); Silano v. Sag Harbor Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 
F.3d 719 (2d Cir. 1994); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1993); Bishop v. 
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So why should the government speech doctrine potentially apply 
in the public school context, other than the reason that the forum 
analysis doctrine is of little use?  This is an important question 
because there is no shortage of government speech in schools.  In 
Steven Smith’s words, “In public schools . . . government gets to 
speak to captive audiences; it speaks to them for hours and days on 
end at the formative period in life—childhood—when people are 
most susceptible to indoctrination.  No other speaker comes close to 
enjoying these discursive advantages.”145  None of the Court’s 
canonical government speech cases have involved the public 
elementary and secondary school context.  Yet, public schools are 
obviously government entities and are subject to the constraints of 
the Constitution, even if individuals’ constitutional rights are 
sometimes slightly different in the public school context than 
outside the schoolhouse gates.146  If schools are proper targets of 
alleged free speech violations, it follows that they should have the 
benefit of a defense generally available to government in other free 
speech cases.  Additionally, the higher education forum analysis 
cases discussed earlier have alluded to the potential application of 
 
Aranov, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991); Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773 
(10th Cir. 1991); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 
1989); Murray v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Pub. Educ., 919 F. Supp. 838, 843 (W.D. 
Penn. 1996); Silva v. Univ. of N.H., 888 F. Supp. 293 (D.N.H. 1994); Burns v. 
Rovaldi, 477 F. Supp. 270 (D. Conn. 1979)) (“[S]everal federal courts have 
rejected the argument that a public school or college classroom is a public 
forum.”); see also Bezanson & Buss, supra note 85, at 1422; Brownstein, supra 
note 10, at 772–73 (noting that the public forum doctrine is rarely employed in 
case law and that in a “great majority of cases the court” holds that no public 
forum exists, although “many cases involve long and sometimes tortured 
discussions attempting to reconcile Hazelwood with forum analysis”); Buss, 
supra, at 276 (“The characterization of a classroom as a designated public forum 
seems far more likely to occur at the university level [than at the K–12 level].”). 
 145. Steven D. Smith, Why Is Government Speech Problematic? The 
Unnecessary Problem, the Unnoticed Problem, and the Big Problem, 87 DENV. U. 
L. REV. 945, 950 (2010); see also White, supra note 45, at 451. 
 146. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007) (holding that 
student speech cases should be decided by rules unique to the school 
environment); Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988); Bethel Sch. 
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. 
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 
U.S. 822, 829–30 (2002) (holding that student search and seizure cases, both 
suspicion based and suspicionless, should be decided by rules unique to the 
school environment); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985); Bd. of 
Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 861 (1982) (“Our precedents have long recognized 
certain constitutional limits upon the power of the State to control even the 
curriculum and classroom.  For example, Meyer v. Nebraska struck down a state 
law that forbade the teaching of modern foreign languages in public and private 
schools, and Epperson v. Arkansas  declared unconstitutional a state law that 
prohibited the teaching of the Darwinian theory of evolution in any state-
supported school.” (citations omitted)). 
W03_BOWMAN  (DO NOT DELETE) 6/19/2013  4:24 PM 
240 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48 
the government speech doctrine to teaching and scholarship in 
colleges and universities, so the leap to public- 
elementary-or-secondary-school-as-government-speaker, especially 
when considering the classroom setting, is not a huge one.147  The 
Court alluded to this in its 1988 decision in Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 
a case about a high school student newspaper that largely predated 
the government speech doctrine but bears much of the same legal 
architecture.148  Finally, the Court in dicta has listed “a public 
school prescribing its curriculum” as an example of a government 
entity engaging in speech.149  Deciding that the government speech 
doctrine could potentially apply to public elementary and secondary 
schools is merely the beginning of the inquiry, though.150 
III.  STATES’ AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS’ SPEECH IN SCHOOLS 
As Steven Shiffrin noted over thirty years ago, “the essence of 
public education is that the state and not parents will ultimately 
decide what is best for children.”151  A large part of deciding what is 
best involves choosing which ideas students will be exposed to, and 
particularly what they will be taught is true and/or morally good.152  
Schools’ messages generally are broad and usually reflect the 
dominant perspective of academic disciplines, but the messages also 
reflect value choices.153  Indeed, as discussed earlier, education is 
not viewpoint neutral.154  Existing case law acknowledges this.  So, 
 
 147. See infra notes 267–75 and accompanying text.  Universities “speak” 
more than public schools, however.  As Bezanson and Buss explain: “Public 
universities do more than allocate fees, of course.  They set curricula, support 
research by their employees, review the teaching and scholarly records of 
faculty for purposes of merit pay and tenure, operate museums, publish books, 
sponsor speakers, and launch academic programs and symposia.”  Bezanson & 
Buss, supra note 85, at 1435. 
 148. 484 U.S. 260 (1988); see also supra Part III.A.1 (discussing Hazelwood). 
 149. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998); 
Bezanson & Buss, supra note 85, at 1419, 1421–22 (explaining the significance 
of this statement and the many questions it raises); see also Epperson v. 
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (“[P]ublic education in our Nation is 
committed to the control of state and local authorities.”). 
 150. Bezanson & Buss, supra note 85, at 1382–83 (asking a long list of 
questions regarding the government speech doctrine and its application). 
 151. Shiffrin, supra note 79, at 648. 
 152. Bezanson & Buss, supra note 85, at 1421–22. 
 153. Id. at 1421–22, 1489; Mark G. Yudof, Personal Speech and Government 
Expression, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 697 (1988). 
 154. Given the general presumption against viewpoint discrimination 
discussed earlier, it may sound shocking to admit this, but scholars have long 
acknowledged that the context of public education is different in many ways, 
including the prevalence of de facto viewpoint discrimination.  Randall 
Bezanson and William Buss have written, “[a]chieving or approaching 
government neutrality in education is not only practically impossible, it is also 
highly inconsistent with the general understanding of what education is trying 
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how would and how should the government speech doctrine apply to 
curriculum and textbook selection by a state or school district; 
teachers’ in-class instructional speech; and schools’ (de)selection of 
library books? 
A. Textbook Selection and Curriculum Determination 
The first category of school speech cases involves state and local 
governments’ decisions to select textbooks and determine various 
aspects of the curriculum.  These cases usually involve challenges by 
students and parents who disagree with the viewpoint(s) presented 
by the government.155  Several Supreme Court cases establish 
guiding principles for resolving these situations, although circuits 
take various approaches to the current controversies. 
1. Deference to Schools, but with Limits 
Battles over the content of public schools’ academic curriculum, 
mandatory nonacademic classroom practices, and textbooks are 
hardly new.  Two of the Court’s earliest decisions involving public 
schools addressed these issues.  The first, Meyer v. Nebraska,156 was 
decided in 1923.  Meyer involved a state statute that prohibited 
public schools from teaching students in any language other than 
English prior to ninth grade and punished any teachers doing so 
with liability for a misdemeanor as well as a fine or jail time.157  In 
Meyer, the Court expressed support for the idea that public schools 
can help to create loyal American citizens, but ultimately struck 
down the regulation under a rational basis test as violating the 
teacher’s and parents’ Fourteenth Amendment liberty rights.158  
Meyer’s focus on the Due Process Clause limits its application today; 
even though Meyer was initiated by a teacher, it remains best 
known as a foundational parental rights case.159   
 
to do.”  Bezanson & Buss, supra note 85, at 1421, 1491; see also Josh Davis & 
Josh Rosenberg, Government as Patron or Regulator in the Student Speech 
Cases, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1047, 1109 (2009); supra note 106 and 
accompanying text. 
 155. See infra Part III.B.  As alluded to earlier, it is not a significant leap to 
infer that states’ and school boards’ textbook selections and curricular decisions 
constitute “the government’s own expression,” especially because the Court has 
stated precisely that in dicta. 
 156. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 157. Id. at 397. 
 158. Id. at 401, 403; id. at 402 (“The power of the state to compel attendance 
at some school and to make reasonable regulations for all schools, including a 
requirement that they shall give instructions in English, is not questioned.  Nor 
has challenge been made of the state’s power to prescribe a curriculum for 
institutions which it supports.”). 
 159. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Emily Buss, What 
the Law Should (and Should Not) Learn from Child Development Research, 38 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 13, 22 (2009). 
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The second decision, West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette,160 came twenty years later in 1943.  Barnette involved an 
extension of the academic curriculum required by the state board of 
education: daily, mandatory participation in the flag salute and 
Pledge of Allegiance by teachers and students.161  Nonparticipating 
students were subject to expulsion until they complied, and parents 
were liable for their child’s truancy with punishment of a fine or jail 
time.162  Barnette required students to speak; the students could not 
opt out and had no ability to alter the message.163  Thus, the speech 
could be characterized as either government-compelled private 
speech or student-articulated government speech, a classification 
question the Court did not resolve.164  Similar to Meyer, the Barnette 
Court conceded that public schools could use the curriculum to 
nurture patriotism but held that the requirement that students 
declare national loyalty went too far.165  The Court did not make 
clear the doctrinal basis for its decision in Barnette; and thus 
lawyers’ and courts’ ability to extrapolate broader precedential value 
from Barnette has been limited.166 
Beginning in the mid-1960s, the Court decided at least a half-
dozen cases involving Establishment Clause violations in public 
school classrooms (these cases are different from the Establishment 
Clause cases that arose out of events such as a graduation ceremony 
or a football game’s pregame proceedings).  This set of classroom-
focused decisions clearly identified the government as a speaker, 
whether through state statute, state board of education policy or 
recommendation, local school board policy or practice, or through 
students.167  These cases include conflicts about the daily classroom 
recitation of a prayer, Bible readings, and/or a moment of silence;168 
 
 160. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (overruling Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 
310 U.S. 586 (1940)). 
 161. Id. at 625–26. 
 162. Id. at 629. 
 163. Id. at 626, 629. 
 164. Haupt, supra note 111, at 610. 
 165. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 640, 642. 
 166. Arguably, Barnette could be a Free Exercise case, a Free Speech case, or 
some sort of political Establishment Clause case or case about a right to not 
participate in a political ceremony.  YUDOF, supra note 66, at 230–33. 
 167. Haupt, supra note 111, at 610. 
 168. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40, 58–61 (1985) (holding 
unconstitutional a series of state statutes (amended while litigation proceeded) 
that first required a moment of silence for elementary school students, then 
permitted a moment of silence “for meditation or voluntary prayer” for students 
in all grades, then authorized participation by “willing students” in a specific 
prayer); Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205, 210 (1963) (holding 
unconstitutional two states’ requirements that public schools begin each day 
with Bible readings, and in one state also the Lord’s Prayer); Engel v. Vitale, 
370 U.S. 421, 422–23, 424–25 (1962) (holding that the state’s decision to 
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the required posting of the Ten Commandments in school 
classrooms;169 and prohibiting instruction about evolution or 
requiring instruction about creationism when evolution is taught.170  
Unlike the prior cases involving conflicts about nationalism, the 
Establishment Clause cases rarely mention the ability of the state 
and local government to control what happens in public schools.   
The two antievolution cases are the exceptions to this rule, and 
perhaps that is because they focused squarely on conflicts about the 
academic curriculum as opposed to daily mandatory practices that 
were not studied or tested.  First, in Epperson v. Arkansas,171 
decided in 1968, the Court struck down a decades-old state statute 
prohibiting instruction about evolution and the adoption of 
textbooks that included information about evolution; teachers 
violating the provision were liable for a misdemeanor and could be 
fired.172  The Epperson Court noted that the state has an “undoubted 
right to prescribe the curriculum for its public schools” but held that 
the statute was invalid because it violated the Establishment 
Clause.173  This language about the state’s authority to prescribe 
curriculum has often been cited in non-Establishment Clause 
classroom speech cases.174  Second, in Edwards v. Aguillard,175 
decided in 1987, the Court rejected the idea that Louisiana’s 
“Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in 
 
authorize and the school board’s decision to implement an optional, 
nondenominational Judeo-Christian prayer recited in classrooms at the 
beginning of the school day violated the Establishment Clause). 
 169. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 39–40 (1980) (granting certiorari and 
summarily reversing, rejecting Kentucky’s statutory requirement that the Ten 
Commandments be posted on each public classroom wall across the state as a 
violation of the Establishment Clause). 
 170. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 
U.S. 97 (1968). 
 171. 393 U.S. 97. 
 172. Id. at 98–99.  The state trial court below focused on the teachers’ and 
students’ rights and held that the statute violated the First Amendment 
because it “tend[ed] to hinder the quest for knowledge, restrict the freedom to 
learn, and restrain the freedom to teach.”  Id. at 100.  The Arkansas Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that the statute was a valid exercise “of the state’s 
power to specify the curriculum in public schools.”  Id. at 101. 
 173. Id. at 107. 
 174. See, e.g., Mercer v. Mich. State Bd. of Educ., 379 F. Supp. 580, 585 (E.D. 
Mich. 1974), aff’d mem., 419 U.S. 1081 (1974).  In 1974, the Court affirmed a 
lower court’s decision without issuing an opinion.  The district court upheld a 
Michigan statute that prohibited schools from discussing birth control in sex 
and health education classes.  See id. at 582 (discussing statute).  The three-
judge district court cited Epperson for the principle that the state had the 
authority to control the curriculum; it held that the state had neither exceeded 
its authority by exercising the statute nor violated other constitutional 
provisions, including the Establishment Clause.  Id. at 584–87. 
 175. 482 U.S. 578 (1987). 
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Public School Instruction Act” was motivated by academic freedom 
concerns as a sham and for various reasons concluded that it 
violated the Establishment Clause.176  Similar to Epperson, the 
Aguillard Court noted the “considerable discretion” normally 
enjoyed by local authorities “in operating public schools.”177  Yet, it 
also emphasized the “coercive power” of the school in molding the 
next generation of citizens, which underscored the importance of not 
violating the Establishment Clause.178 
The next year, in 1988, the Court decided Hazelwood v. 
Kuhlmeier.  Hazelwood is customarily classified as a student speech 
case, and of course it is that.  But because the speech at issue 
occurred in the context of the classroom and as part of the 
curriculum, Hazelwood also fits naturally into this synthesis of 
instructional speech cases in ways that the core traditional student 
speech cases (Tinker,179 Fraser,180 and Morse181) do not.  In 
Hazelwood, students in a journalism class produced the school 
newspaper; when the school principal excised two pages of one 
newspaper issue because of concerns about age appropriateness and 
confidentiality raised by some of the articles, the student journalists 
challenged that action.182  Unlike in Meyer and Barnette, in 
Hazelwood the school ultimately won.183  In its decision, the Court 
set forth what has become known as the Hazelwood test: when 
speech bears the “imprimatur of the school,” schools’ restrictions on 
that speech are allowed if they are “reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns.”184  It is undisputed that the government 
speech doctrine was “inchoate” when Hazelwood was decided.  Still, 
some scholars view Hazelwood as a case that “shares many of the 
features and has a lot of the legal DNA of the modern” government 
speech doctrine,185 and others view it as a case about “government’s 
role as regulator” of private speech.186  Either way, Hazelwood has 
 
 176. Id. at 593–97. 
 177. Id. at 583. 
 178. Id. at 584–85. 
 179. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 180. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 181. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 182. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263–64 (1988). 
 183. Id. at 266. 
 184. Id. at 273 (“[E]ducators do not offend the First Amendment by 
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in 
school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably 
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”). 
 185. E-mail from Frank Ravitch to author (Aug. 10, 2012) (“Hazelwood is 
like the Homo Erectus of government speech.  It had not yet evolved into the 
modern doctrine, but it shares many of the features and has a lot of the legal 
DNA of the modern doctrine.”). 
 186. Bezanson & Buss, supra note 85, at 1418; Yudof, supra note 153, at 
685. 
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great relevance to the situations discussed here.  The school district 
defendant in Hazelwood won at the Supreme Court level and the 
theme of deference to states and schools dominated that decision. 
Taken together, these cases illustrate an important overall 
theme: in curricular speech cases, the Court strongly encourages 
deference to the state as educator, but the deference is not 
unqualified.  This dynamic was present in Meyer,187 Barnette,188 
Epperson,189 Aguillard,190 and Hazelwood.191  However, except for 
Hazelwood, the Court ultimately found for the plaintiffs, noting the 
general presumption of deference and then explaining that the state 
action in question was so far beyond the pale that the Court simply 
could not let it stand.192  Those outcomes stand in stark contrast to 
the outcomes of contemporary circuit-level textbook and curriculum 
disputes, which the state almost always wins. 
2. Current Controversies and Circuit Splits About Curriculum 
and Textbooks 
Recently, evolution and intelligent design controversies have 
constituted many of the most visible controversies about curricular 
determination and textbook selection.  These disputes include a local 
school board’s 2006 decision in Dover, Pennsylvania, to teach 
intelligent design,193 the Kansas State Board of Education’s 
seemingly biannual debates about the state’s evolution-related state 
 
 187. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400, 402 (1923). 
 188. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
 189. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 108 (1968). 
 190. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 596 (1987). 
 191. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeir, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988). 
 192. In Meyer and Barnette, the Court ultimately stepped in and imposed 
limits on the state’s ability to indoctrinate students with patriotic beliefs; in 
Epperson and Aguillard, the Court rejected states’ attempts to present religious 
beliefs in public school classrooms.  Cases focused on challenging the 
indoctrination of patriotism have been rare since Barnette was decided in the 
1940s; however, Establishment Clause cases have been much more common 
since then.  When considering curricular speech cases, it is in this latter area–
the Establishment Clause–that states and school districts have most 
consistently lost at the Supreme Court level and in lower courts; judicial 
opinions often seem to imply that these sorts of violations are beyond the pale 
in ways that other classroom speech decisions are not, even if those 
controversies arise out of decisions different than ones individual Justices 
would have made.  See supra notes 187–91 and accompanying text. 
 193. Bowman, supra note 68, at 419–20, passim.  Although states have 
increasingly specific standards, many still leave room for more specific 
curricular decisions to be made at the school- and school-district level.  These 
decisions may be made by the locally elected school board members, by 
professional educators in the district’s central administration or building 
administration, or in the case of an elective course or a permissive district, by 
individual teachers. 
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science standards,194 and the Texas Board of Education’s debates 
about which science textbooks to approve.195  Textbook and 
curricular controversies are neither new nor limited to those issues, 
though.  States require instruction about a variety of potentially 
controversial issues and have done so since before the colonies 
declared independence from England.196  For example, today states 
mandate instruction about sex education (abstinence-only or 
comprehensive approaches; many of the former, in particular, 
perpetuate traditional gender roles);197 the holocaust (Illinois);198 the 
Armenian genocide (Massachusetts);199 the superiority of democracy 
and the free market (Alabama);200 and the historical contributions of 
various groups of people, including gays and lesbians (California).201  
States also are taking steps to explicitly limit what is taught: one 
state has prohibited a critical race studies curriculum designed by a 
 
 194. Id. at 421 n.11.  All states but one have subject–matter content 
standards which stipulate, in varying levels of detail, what should be taught in 
required subjects at various grade levels.  These standards are customarily 
established and modified by the state board of education, a body whose 
members may be elected or may be appointed by the governor depending on the 
state.  State standards have gained teeth increasingly over the past decade with 
the rise of the “accountability” movement and its focus on testing, because the 
tests in each state should be designed to assess the degree to which students 
are acquiring knowledge and skills contained in that state’s standards. 
 195. Kate Alexander, State Board of Education Delves Again into  
Science Debate, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, July 20, 2011, available at 
http://www.statesman.com/news/texas-politics/state-board-of-education-delves 
-again-into-science-1629355.html.  Some states exercise greater control over 
curriculum by selecting a single textbook, or approving various textbooks, that 
schools may use at given grade levels.  State involvement in textbook selection 
is an extension of a state’s involvement with setting and modifying standards 
and thus standardizing the education students receive across the state.  If 
states do not select/approve textbooks, then local school boards usually do so, 
although (as with curriculum), teachers of elective courses may have more 
discretion over the textbook(s) they use. 
 196. Susan H. Bitensky, A Contemporary Proposal for Reconciling the Free 
Speech Clause with Curricular Values Inculcation in the Public Schools, 70 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 769, 774–76 (1995) (“[A]s early as 1647, the colony of 
Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that children be taught such 
virtues . . . ” linking religion and morals education.  Explicit values education 
continued through the Civil War era and beyond.). 
 197. Jennifer S. Hendricks & Dawn Marie Howerton, Teaching Values, 
Teaching Stereotypes: Sex Education and Indoctrination in Public Schools, 13 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 587 passim (2011). 
 198. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/27-20.3 (2012) (Holocaust and Genocide Study). 
 199. 1998 Mass. Acts 1154. 
 200. ALA. CODE § 16–40–3 (2012). 
 201. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51213 (Deering 2000) (no disparagement of the same 
groups); id. § 51500; id. § 51530; Erik W. Robelen, Calif. Governor Signs Gay-
History Bill, EDUC. WK., Aug. 10, 2011, at 6; Erik W. Robelen, California May 
Mandate Inclusion of Gay History in Curricula, EDUC. WK., Apr. 27, 2011, at 10. 
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local school district (Arizona),202 and in another, a bill is pending 
that would “bar discussion of homosexuality in K–8 classrooms” 
(Tennessee).203  Additionally, since her retirement from the Court, 
Justice O’Connor has been an advocate for civic education in public 
elementary and secondary schools; recently, Justice Breyer has 
joined her cause.204 
Textbook selection and curricular determination disputes often 
reach the courts.  Over the past thirty-five years, nine circuits have 
decided non-Establishment Clause cases in which students, parents, 
or others challenged a state or local government decision regarding 
school curriculum or textbook selection.205  States and school 
districts almost never lose these cases.206  Circuits employ three 
different tests to decide these cases, although the circuit split can be 
explained in large part as reflecting a particular chronology.  First, 
 
 202. Litigation is ongoing in Acosta v. Huppenthal, No. 10–CV–623–TUC–
AWT, 2013 WL 871892 (D. Ariz. Mar. 8, 2013).  Mary Ann Zehr, Ethnic-Studies 
Classes Tense Subject in Tucson, EDUC. WK., July 13, 2011, at 30–31; Litigation, 
SAVE ETHNIC STUDIES, http://saveethnicstudies.org/litigation.shtml (last visited 
Jan. 19, 2013). 
 203. Richard Fausset, Tennessee ‘Don’t Say Gay’ Bill Clears a Hurdle in 
State House, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2012. 
 204. Debra Cassens Weiss, For Justice Breyer, the Need for Civic Education 




 205. I focus on non-Establishment Clause cases here because Establishment 
Clause cases are governed by a distinct set of doctrinal rules, and the Court has 
already declared that the Establishment Clause is an exception to the 
government speech doctrine.  For the curious, two of the most notable circuit-
level Establishment Clause curriculum/textbook cases are Smith v. Board of 
School Commissioners of Mobile County, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987) and 
Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 206. See, e.g., Griswold v. Driscoll, 616 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2010); Chiras v. 
Miller, 432 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 2005); Planned Parenthood v. Clark Cnty. Sch. 
Dist., 887 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1989); Virgil v. Sch. Bd., 862 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 
1989); Pratt v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 831, 670 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1982); Seyfried 
v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1981); Zykan v. Warsaw Cnty. Sch. Corp., 631 
F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980); Cary v. Bd. of Educ., 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979); 
Minarcini v. Strongsville City Sch. Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976); see also 
Bezanson & Buss, supra note 85, at 1422 (“It is widely accepted that education 
is immune to First Amendment challenges even though the state selects what 
to communicate in public schools on the basis of content.”); Waldman, supra 
note 106, at 75–79 (discussing the application of Hazelwood to textbook and 
curricular decision cases, though considering teacher-initiated cases in the 
same category as student/parent-initiated cases); Yudof, supra note 153, at 683 
(“If the expression is governmental and not personal, students generally may 
not interfere with the school’s articulation of its own educational messages.  
They do not have a constitutional right to add or delete courses from the 
curriculum, alter the teacher’s lesson plan, or scrutinize the school district’s 
choice of textbooks.”). 
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of the five circuits that have not considered these issues since the 
Court decided Hazelwood in 1984, all five discussed the general 
deference that states and school districts should receive in 
curricular matters, absent some beyond-the-pale violation of a core 
constitutional principle (the one case plaintiffs won at the appellate 
level involved invidious viewpoint discrimination).207  These 
decisions regularly invoked the Court’s language about deference to 
states and school boards from the Establishment Clause curricular 
cases and thus picked up the deference theme that runs through all 
of the Court’s cases related to curricular speech.208  Second, the two 
circuits to consider curricular/textbook cases after Hazelwood in 
1984 and before the government speech doctrine had gained traction 
in the mid-2000s employed Hazelwood’s test as the mode of analysis, 
although in a recent unpublished decision, one of those circuits 
employed the government speech doctrine without mentioning 
Hazelwood.209  Given the factual similarity of Hazelwood as a case 
also about curricular speech, the greater specificity of the test in 
Hazelwood as compared to the general deference principles, and the 
later rise of the government speech doctrine, this timing makes 
sense. 
Third and perhaps most interestingly, the three circuits to 
consider these issues most recently have invoked the government 
speech doctrine.  The Fifth Circuit held in 2005 that the state’s 
approval of textbooks was properly analyzed under the government 
speech doctrine as a natural extension of the cases that emphasized 
deference to states and school districts.210  The First Circuit, in an 
opinion written by Justice Souter in 2010 after his retirement from 
the Court, held that a state-level advisory curriculum guide was 
properly evaluated under one of three consistent “strands” of 
Supreme Court cases: those emphasizing schools’ role in creating 
the next generation of citizens, those emphasizing deference to state 
and local school boards unless in the face of a constitutional 
violation, and those establishing the government speech doctrine.211  
Finally, in 2011, the Ninth Circuit’s unpublished opinion, alluded to 
in the previous paragraph, held that a state charter school 
commission could prohibit “sectarian or denominational texts in 
public schools” because the textbooks were government speech.212  
 
 207. Pratt, 670 F.2d at 775; Seyfried, 668 F.2d at 217; Zykan, 631 F.2d at 
1305; Cary, 598 F.2d at 543; Minarcini, 541 F.2d at 582. 
 208. Pratt, 670 F.2d at 775; Seyfried, 668 F.2d at 217; Zykan, 631 F.2d at 
1305; Cary, 598 F.2d at 543; Minarcini, 541 F.2d at 582. 
 209. Nampa Classical Acad. v. Goesling, 447 F. App’x 776, 778 (9th Cir. 
2011); Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 887 F.2d at 940; Virgil, 862 F.2d at 1521. 
 210. Chiras, 432 F.3d at 611–15. 
 211. Griswold, 616 F.3d at 58–59. 
 212. Nampa Classical Acad., 447 F. App’x at 777–78. 
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The Ninth Circuit did not discuss an alternate test.213  None of these 
three cases relied on Hazelwood (in fact, the Fifth Circuit explicitly 
rejected the use of Hazelwood),214 and the state/school board won all 
three cases.215  As this chronology demonstrates, in curriculum and 
textbook decision cases, the momentum certainly favors the 
government speech doctrine. 
3. Curriculum and Textbooks: Government Speech in Many 
Ways, but the Government Speech Doctrine Should Not Apply 
If the government speech doctrine applies at all to public 
schools—and, as discussed above, there is no obvious and 
overwhelming reason why that would not be the case—there are 
several reasons why it would seem to apply to textbook and 
curriculum selection disputes.  However, even though applying the 
government speech doctrine would only marginally strengthen the 
government’s position, the arguments that it should apply are 
ultimately trumped by the ways in which the government speech 
doctrine would undermine the public goods created by public 
education. 
The arguments in favor of applying the government speech 
doctrine are not few or weak.  First, and this is not always the 
case,216 in curricular determination and textbook selection cases, the 
government is more clearly the speaker than in other situations: 
states and local school boards make decisions about what their 
agents will communicate in public schools.  Because the government 
is the speaker, the public arguably can hold the government 
accountable for its speech through democratic processes such as 
advocating for statutory or policy reform directly, or by voting out 
legislators and/or state or local school board members.217  This 
consideration is significant. 
Second, the government speech doctrine is generally consistent 
with the deference courts grant to states and school boards in these 
types of cases.  This consistency exists at a macro level: deference to 
states and school districts has been the most consistent theme 
expressed by the Supreme Court and by lower courts when they 
have grappled with curricular and textbook cases for the past ninety 
 
 213. Id. at 778. 
 214. Id. at 776; Griswold, 616 F.3d at 53; Chiras, 432 F.3d at 615–18. 
 215. Nampa Classical Acad., 447 F. App’x at 776; Griswold, 616 F.3d at 54; 
Chiras, 432 F.3d at 606. 
 216. See supra Parts I.B.1 and III. 
 217. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 46–70 (2009); Lee, 
supra note 117, at 1052–53; Norton, supra note 119, at 21; Norton & Citron, 
supra note 83, at 902. 
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years.218  Neither the Court nor the government speech doctrine 
would permit unchecked deference; the Court’s government speech 
decisions have made clear that the doctrine does not trump the 
Establishment Clause, and there may be other exceptions as well.219  
The consistency reemerges on a practical level: as the circuits’ 
decisions have demonstrated, courts do not favor allowing students 
and parents to control the curriculum.220  Thus, applying the 
government speech doctrine would not substantially change the 
outcomes of future such cases.  Nine of the ten non-Establishment 
Clause circuit-level legal battles about curricular content discussed 
here have been decided in favor of schools, even though only one of 
these decisions relied strongly on the government speech doctrine to 
reach its result (two, if we include the unpublished decision from the 
Ninth Circuit).221  If the government speech doctrine were applied, 
the state would very likely have won all ten of these cases. 
Third, employing the government speech doctrine would 
eliminate doctrinal variations among circuits.  Although the two 
circuits to most recently issue published decisions in these types of 
cases both invoked the government speech doctrine, only one relied 
on it exclusively, suggesting uncertainty about the doctrine’s 
status.222  (Also, as noted above, the circuit to decide this type of 
case most recently assumed that the government speech doctrine 
applied, but the decision was not published.223) 
While the above reasons at first glance seem to demonstrate the 
doctrine’s solid fit with this category of cases, ultimately these 
reasons are trumped by the substantial ways in which the 
government speech doctrine could undermine the public goods 
identified earlier.  First, in the foundational Supreme Court 
decisions in which courts have rejected school boards’ and state 
legislatures’ determinations about curriculum, the courts have held 
 
 218. The principle of deference reflects the basic relationship among parents, 
students, and the state regarding public education, expressed in Meyer and 
many other cases, that, by enrolling children in public schools, parents cede 
substantial, albeit incomplete, control over their children’s socialization; and 
students have an even more limited ability to influence what they themselves 
learn in public schools.  See supra Parts II.A.1 and II.A.2. 
 219. See supra Part I.A. 
 220. Now, Hazelwood, which some circuits use to decide these cases, does 
not press deference as far as the government speech doctrine does.  But as 
Emily Gold Waldman has convincingly argued, Hazelwood has never been a 
good fit for curricular or textbook selection cases, and forcing it to apply to these 
cases unnecessarily creates circuit splits about the permissibility of viewpoint 
discrimination, among other issues.  Waldman, supra note 106, passim; see also 
supra Parts I.A and II.A.1. 
 221. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 222. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 223. Nampa Classical Acad. v. Goesling, 447 F. App’x 776, 778 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
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that the state’s decision is constitutionally objectionable because it 
undermines the proper state goal of creating citizens to sustain our 
democracy. 
Second, and more specifically, consider the situations that gave 
rise to Meyer and Barnette—through a distorted political process, 
state legislatures enacted laws that compelled patriotism in schools.  
If the judicial process had not been available, the statutes could 
have remained on the books for quite some time if not indefinitely.  
When the political process is distorted, the judicial check on 
government speech becomes even more important.  But the 
government speech doctrine makes the judicial check substantially 
weaker: although plaintiffs almost never win curricular and 
textbook selection cases these days, the government speech doctrine 
would make the resolution of those cases even more certain because 
it permits marginally more viewpoint discrimination than current 
case law.  Thus, these cases would be more likely disposed of via a 
motion to dismiss early in the litigation.  This likely early resolution 
and thus inability to recover fees could then further deter plaintiffs 
from challenging textbook and curricular decisions in the first place, 
and deter them from bringing cases such as the lone circuit-level 
case that was decided in favor of the plaintiffs based on a viewpoint 
discrimination argument.224  Although plaintiffs could still have 
brought due process claims, under the government speech doctrine 
their speech claims would have been foreclosed.   
To be sure, since we do have Meyer, Barnette, and the Court’s 
2007 decision in the student speech case Morse v. Frederick as 
precedent, a court could rely on those three decisions to articulate 
some sort of political establishment exception that falls within the 
“limiting law, regulation or practice” language from Pleasant Grove 
City v. Summum.225  In fact, in Morse v. Frederick, the school argued 
that it could censor student speech that “interferes with a school’s 
‘educational mission.’”226  Justice Alito, in a concurrence, was the 
only Justice to squarely address this claim.  In his words: “The 
‘educational mission’ argument would give public school authorities 
a license to suppress speech on political and social issues based on 
disagreement with the viewpoint expressed.  The argument, 
therefore, strikes at the very heart of the First Amendment.”227  
Justice Alito is not the first Justice or citizen to balk at political 
 
 224. See supra Part I.A. 
 225. 555 U.S. 460, 469–70 (2009).  Many view the lasting legacy of Barnette 
in particular as carving out patriotism as something, like religion, that the state 
can support but cannot compel.  See supra Part II.A.1. 
 226. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 423 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring).  
Morse v. Frederick is the 2007 “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” banner case that will be 
discussed in detail, infra Part IV.A. 
 227. Morse, 551 U.S. at 423 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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“establishment” by, or unchecked deference to, public schools.  
However, hoping that a trial judge or even a federal circuit would 
rely on the concurring opinion of one Justice and two decades-old 
cases that are not clearly connected to a specific constitutional 
provision228 to cobble together a creative exception to a far-reaching 
doctrine that has few articulated exceptions is a substantial risk. 
In sum, although the government speech doctrine is in many 
ways a solid fit for cases involving students’ and parents’ challenges 
to textbook selection and curricular determination, this fit is 
trumped by overarching concerns about the way in which the 
doctrine could undermine the creation of the next generation of 
citizens and also reduce meaningful political and judicial checks on 
government speech. 
B. Teachers’ Instructional Speech 
The previous Subpart focused on challenges to textbook 
selection and curricular content brought mainly by students and 
parents.  This Subpart turns to disputes about messages teachers 
convey, or want to convey, in the classroom.  Some of these disputes 
are about control over textbooks and formal curriculum, and others 
are about teachers’ expression of their own viewpoints via less 
formal instructional speech.229  When teachers are plaintiffs, the 
state’s interests are somewhat different than when students and 
parents are plaintiffs.  Vis-à-vis students and parents, the state is 
creating the next generation of citizens in a constitutionally sound 
manner.  By enrolling their children in public schools, parents cede 
much of their authority over the socialization process to the state; 
yet as I argued in Subpart III.A immediately above, parents and 
students should also retain the ability to meaningfully challenge the 
state’s curricular and textbook decisions through the political and/or 
judicial process—an enforcement mechanism which is itself a public 
good. 
Teachers share at least some of the state’s interest in creating 
the next generation of citizens, and they also bring to bear expertise 
about content and pedagogy.  Additionally, unlike students or 
parents, teachers are state actors, and the core of the relationship 
between teachers and the school is one of employee-employer.  The 
public goods identified in Part I.A are thus largely irrelevant to 
teachers’ academic freedom cases.  Although it is beyond the scope of 
 
 228. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 229. As a short Harvard Law Review piece recently noted, “teachers in 
public schools often act as government agents beyond the confines of their 
formal curriculum.”  First Amendment – Free Speech in Schools – Ninth Circuit 
Holds that Teacher Speech in School-Related Settings Is Necessarily 
Government Speech – Johnson v. Poway Unified School District, 658 F.3d 954 
(9th Cir. 2011), 125 HARV. L. REV. 1868, 1875 (2012). 
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this Article to argue that teachers should or should not have First 
Amendment rights in public schools or beyond—that is the subject of 
a substantial and still-growing literature230—in this Subpart I 
analyze only whether there is anything substantially unique about 
the school environment that justifies protecting teachers’ 
instructional speech more than the official capacity speech of public 
employees in other settings.231 
1. Teachers’ Limited Instructional Speech Rights 
In addition to the cases that focus on the textbooks or 
curriculum selected by the state or the school, another line of 
Supreme Court cases is relevant to the discussion of teachers’ 
instructional speech rights.  This line of cases, the Court’s public 
employee speech cases, began in 1968 with Pickering v. Board of 
Education,232 which involved a teacher who wrote a letter to the 
editor of the newspaper about proposals for raising school revenue.  
It continued in 1983 with Connick v. Meyers233 and concluded in 
2006 with Garcetti v. Ceballos;234 the plaintiffs in Connick and 
Garcetti were both government attorneys who contested their 
superiors’ actions. 
The rules from these three cases fit together as follows: a public 
employee must be speaking as a citizen about a matter of public 
 
 230. See generally, e.g., Kimberly Gee, Establishing a Constitutional 
Standard that Protects Public School Teacher Classroom Expression, 38 J. L. & 
EDUC. 409 (2009); Neal H. Hutchens, Silence at the Schoolhouse Gate: The 
Diminishing First Amendment Rights of Public School Employees, 97 KY. L.J. 
37 (2008); Emily White Kirsch, First Amendment Protection of Teachers’ 
Instructional Speech: Extending Rust v. Sullivan to Ensure that Teachers Do 
Not Distort the Government Message, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 185 (2010); Norton, 
supra note 15; Paul M. Secunda, Garcetti’s Impact on the First Amendment 
Speech Rights of Federal Employees, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 117 (2008); Ronald 
D. Wenkart, Annotation, The Free Speech Rights of K-12 Teachers After 
Garcetti, 269 ED. L. REP. 1 (2011) [hereinafter Wenkart, Free Speech Rights]; 
Ralph D. Mawdsley, Annotation, Garcetti v. Ceballows and Classroom 
Instruction: The Sixth Circuit Creates Diminished Free Speech Protection for 
Classroom Teachers, 266 ED. L. REP. 1 (2011); Scott Bauries & Patrick Schach, 
Annotation, Coloring Outside the Lines: Garcetti v. Ceballos in the Federal 
Appellate Courts, 262 ED. L. REP. 357 (2011); Ronald D. Wenkart, Annotation, 
Public School Curriculum and the Free Speech Rights of Teachers, 214 ED. L. 
REP. 1 (2006). 
 231. I do not contend that the public school environment justifies giving 
teachers fewer rights than other public employees, though.  For example, it 
seems entirely appropriate and consistent with the general public employee-
employer relationship that teachers receive appropriate notice before being 
disciplined for making unapproved changes to the curriculum or pedagogy.  See 
Gee, supra note 230, at 413–14, 449–52; Hutchens, supra note 230, at 62. 
 232. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 233. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
 234. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
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concern for his or her speech to have any First Amendment 
protection.  If that requirement is satisfied, then a court applies the 
presumption that a “government entity has broader discretion to 
restrict speech when it acts in its role as employer,” and requires 
that “the restrictions [the government] imposes must be directed at 
speech that has some potential to affect the entity’s operations.”235  
Specifically, employees “must face only those speech restrictions 
that are necessary for their employers to operate efficiently and 
effectively.”236  In Garcetti, the Court refined this doctrine to clarify 
that speech made “pursuant to [a public employee’s] official 
responsibilities” is not protected by the First Amendment, and that 
“official duty” speech and “private citizen” speech are mutually 
exclusive.237  Thus, because the government effectively hires “official 
duty” speech, it is the government’s speech to control.238  The Court 
offered one potential caveat to the broad rule of Garcetti, noting that 
it was not deciding whether “expression related to academic 
scholarship or classroom instruction” was included in official-duty 
speech because of academic freedom concerns.239  This caveat echoes 
the Court’s respect for teachers’ academic freedom and personal 
political freedom expressed during the 1960s in Shelton v. Tucker240 
and Keyishan v. Board of Regents.241  Although the Court did not 
specify, it seems much more likely the Garcetti caveat applies, if at 
all, in the higher education context rather than in the elementary/ 
secondary education context because courts historically have been 
extremely reluctant to recognize academic freedom rights for 
elementary and secondary teachers, while the concept of academic 
freedom has become fairly robust in the college and university 
setting.242 
Four broad principles from these cases are especially relevant to 
the question of teachers’ instructional speech rights.  First, Garcetti 
is a government speech case, although by its own terms it may not 
apply to educational settings.  Second, as numerous commentators 
have noted, Garcetti in particular limits public employees’ speech 
rights to a point where they have almost wasted away, although 
 
 235. Id. at 418. 
 236. Id. at 419. 
 237. Id. at 421–22, 424. 
 238. Id.; Norton & Citron, supra note 83, at 911. 
 239. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425. 
 240. 364 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1960). 
 241. 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). 
 242. YUDOF, supra note 10, at 16–17; Judith Areen, Government as 
Educator: A New Understanding of First Amendment Protection of Academic 
Freedom and Governance, 97 GEO. L.J. 945 passim (2009) (focusing on academic 
freedom in the higher education context); W. Stuart Stuller, High School 
Academic Freedom: The Evolution of a Fish out of Water, 77 NEB. L. REV. 301 
passim (1998). 
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some of this appears due to circuits’ application of Garcetti to speech 
that is outside of a teacher’s or public employee’s official capacity.243  
Third, even before Garcetti, teachers’ instructional speech rights 
under Pickering and Connick were virtually nil.244  Fourth, the 
Supreme Court’s public employee speech cases are consistent with 
its classroom and textbook cases because all make clear that the 
rights and interests of the state are substantial and are usually 
strong enough to trump the rights of individual speakers. 
2. Teachers’ Instructional Speech: Current Controversies and 
Circuit Splits 
Contemporary conflicts about teachers’ speech often involve 
teachers being disciplined for using particular materials or 
pedagogical approaches other than those that have been approved 
by the state or by the local school district.245  These types of conflicts 
may become even more frequent with the rise of common (de facto 
national) educational standards and accompanying curriculum 
produced by the standards writers.246  As of March 2013, forty-five 
states, four territories, and the District of Columbia have 
voluntarily accepted standards in language arts and math created 
by the Common Core State Standards Initiative.247  National science 
standards are in the pipeline, as well.248  Recently, the national 
standards have come under fire from previous supporters as 
 
 243. See, e.g., Norton, supra note 15, at 1267–68; Wenkart, Free Speech 
Rights, supra note 230, at 27–28; Mawdsley, supra note 230, at 16–17; Bauries 
& Schach, supra note 230, at 357–59, 363, 373–83. 
 244. See, e.g., Gee, supra note 230, at 413–14, 440–42. 
 245. It is these classroom conflicts on which this Article focuses, not 
teachers’ off-duty speech.  For a thorough analysis of teachers’ off-duty speech, 
see Norton, supra note 119, at 1–2. 
 246. Catherine Gewirtz, Standards Writers Wade into Curriculum, EDUC. 
WK., Aug. 10, 2011, at 1, 17 (“Barbara Cambridge, the director of the 
Washington office of the National Council of Teachers of English, said her 
organization agrees that it’s important to articulate how materials should 
reflect the standards.  But the new publishers’ criteria, [in Cambridge’s words,] 
‘signal a usurpation of teacher judgment in ways that are alarming.’”). 
 247. In the States, COMMON CORE ST. STANDARDS INITIATIVE, 
http://www.corestandards.org/in-the-states (last visited Mar. 22, 2013).  The 
Initiative is “a state-led effort coordinated by the National Governors 
Association Center for Best Practices . . . and the Council of Chief State  
School Officers.”  About the Standards, COMMON CORE ST. STANDARDS 
INITIATIVE, http://www.corestandards.org/about-the-standards (last visited Jan. 
26, 2013). 
 248. Erik W. Robelen, New Science Framework Paves Way for Academic 
Standards, EDUC. WK., Aug. 10, 2011, at 8–9.  The drafts of the standards are 
available at NEXT GENERATION SCIENCE STANDARDS (Jan. 28, 2013), 
http://www.nextgenscience.org/next-generation-science-standards.  The third 
draft of the science standards is expected to become public in March 2013. 
W03_BOWMAN  (DO NOT DELETE) 6/19/2013  4:24 PM 
256 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48 
essentially mediocre.249  Given that at least one commentator and 
likely many educators are of the opinion that state and local school 
board members are rarely as well qualified to establish curriculum 
as teachers and other professional educators, it would not be 
surprising for teacher-initiated conflicts about these national 
standards, in particular, to increase in frequency, and to result in 
litigation.250 
The starting point for analyzing such claims is Hazelwood, in 
which the Supreme Court noted: “A number of lower federal courts 
have . . . recognized that educators’ decisions with regard to the 
content of school-sponsored newspapers, dramatic productions, and 
other expressive activities are entitled to substantial deference.”251  
However, as a practical matter, this deference to individual 
teachers—at least as compared to entities such as school boards and 
state boards of education—is a thing of the past.  Over the past 
twenty years, eleven circuits (all but the District of Columbia 
Circuit) have considered cases directly involving elementary and 
secondary teachers’ in-class, instructional speech or cases that arise 
out of slightly different facts but state rules that appear to cover this 
category of speech.252  The circuits apply or acknowledge that they 
are deciding between one of three tests.  The circuit splits are indeed 
interesting, if ultimately largely irrelevant to the outcomes of the 
cases, because, as with the student and parent challenges to 
curriculum and textbooks, the state somehow almost always wins. 
The variation is as follows: First, four circuits focus on the 
specific context of the speech—a public school—and import 
Hazelwood’s test to determine whether the school’s restriction of the 
teacher’s speech was appropriate.253  If circuits apply Hazelwood, 
they start with the presumption that the teacher has at least some 
speech rights in the classroom, but that the school can restrict the 
teacher’s speech if it has a legitimate pedagogical reason for 
 
 249. Andrew C. Porter, In Common Core, Little to Cheer About, EDUC. WK., 
Aug. 10, 2011, at 24–25.  Porter is the dean of the University of Pennsylvania 
Graduate School of Education.  His piece In Common Core was published two 
years after a similar Education Week op-ed he wrote with Morgan S. Polikoff in 
2009 endorsing the adoption of national common standards; that earlier piece 
accompanies In Common Core in excerpted form. 
 250. Susan P. Stuart, Citizen Teacher: Damned If You Do, Damned If You 
Don’t, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1281, 1327–28 (2008). 
 251. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 n.7 (1988). 
 252. Waldman, supra note 106, at 75–87 (discussing these cases). 
 253. Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1202–
04 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that Garcetti applies to out-of-class speech about 
curriculum and pedagogy); Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 
718, 724 (8th Cir. 1998); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993); 
Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1070–71 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that 
Hazelwood applies to university-level in-class speech of a teacher and impliedly 
also to the in-class speech of elementary and secondary teachers). 
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imposing the restriction.  This rule is the most protective of 
teachers’ speech rights in theory, though in practice it is so 
permissive that teachers rarely win.254  Second, two more circuits 
strongly invoke the theme of deference to the school board but do not 
use a more specific test.  One of these circuits relies on school 
districts’ control of the curriculum without specifically choosing the 
Hazelwood or Connick/Pickering/Garcetti approach.255  The other 
circuit declared in an unpublished opinion in 2008, post-Garcetti, 
that the choice between these two approaches (Hazelwood and the 
public employee speech cases) is an open question.256 
Third, six other circuits focus on the status of teachers as public 
employees and thus apply some combination of Connick, Pickering, 
and Garcetti, the Court’s generally applicable public employee 
speech cases.257  One of these circuits applies only Connick and 
Pickering but has not decided a teacher or school employee speech 
case since Garcetti.258  Another circuit has determined, post-
Garcetti, that Garcetti is not applicable to teachers’ instructional 
speech disputes although Connick and Pickering remain relevant.259  
The remaining four circuits employ the government speech doctrine 
via Garcetti in cases that address or could easily be read to 
 
 254. See Brownstein, supra note 10, at 753; Dan V. Kozlowski, Unchecked 
Deference: Hazelwood’s Too Broad and Too Loose Application in the Circuit 
Courts, 3 J. MEDIA L. & ETHICS 1, 30–37 (2012); Waldman, supra note 106, at 
90–94. 
 255. Borden v. Sch. Dist. of Twp. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 171 n.13. 
(3d Cir. 2008) (holding that Garcetti’s applicability is an open question to out-of-
class speech by a football coach); Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 
1172, 1176 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that Hazelwood does not apply to a teacher’s 
in-class speech). 
 256. Panse v. Eastwood, 303 F. App’x 933, 934 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 257. Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 961 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(applying Pickering and Garcetti); Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 624 F.3d 332, 
337 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Garcetti, Pickering, and Connick); Mayer v. 
Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 478 (7th Cir. 2007) (applying 
Garcetti and Pickering); Lee v. York Cnty. Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 692, 694 (4th 
Cir. 2007) (applying Pickering and Connick but rejecting Garcetti); Brammer-
Hoelter, 492 F.3d at 1202 (applying Garcetti and Pickering); Boring v. 
Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 368–69 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc) 
(applying Pickering and Connick pre-Garcetti); Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 692 (5th Cir. 2007) (applying Garcetti in a case in which a 
high school football coach engaged in nonclassroom speech; read together with 
Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 797–98 (5th Cir. 1989), in 
which the Fifth Circuit applied Pickering and Connick pre-Garcetti). 
 258. Boring, 136 F.3d at 368–69. 
 259. Lee, 484 F.3d at 694–95 n.11.  For various reasons, even circuits that 
apply only Connick and Pickering have concluded that teachers are not 
permitted to express their opinions about the curriculum by unilaterally 
modifying that curriculum.  Id. at 694. 
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encompass teachers’ instructional speech.260  These four circuits 
reason that school districts hire teachers’ speech when the teacher 
and the district enter into an employment contract; thus, teachers’ 
instructional, official-duty speech does not belong to the teachers 
themselves, but rather is the speech of the government.261 
For better or worse, the circuit splits make no difference when it 
comes to the outcomes of the cases—in the definitive cases in all 
eleven circuits, the teachers lost their free speech claims.262  The 
consistency of these outcomes may occur, in part, because ten of the 
eleven circuits incorporated government speech principles into these 
decisions, even when the decisions predated the rise and increasing 
prominence of the government speech doctrine.  Specifically, circuits 
that rely on Hazelwood often focus on the teacher’s in-class, 
 
 260. Johnson, 658 F.3d at 967 (holding that teacher speech in the classroom 
via banners was unrelated to the curriculum); Brammer-Hoelter, 492 F.3d at 
1204 (involving a charter school, and not involving classroom speech); Evans-
Marshall, 624 F.3d at 337; Mayer, 474 F.3d at 478; Williams, 480 F.3d at 692; 
Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 797. 
 261. Evans-Marshall, 624 F.3d at 340 (“[I]f it is the school board that hires 
that speech, it can surely ‘regulate the content of what is or is not expressed.’” 
(quoting Mayer, 474 F.3d at 479)); Mayer, 474 F.3d at 479 (stating that when a 
teacher teaches, “the school system does not ‘regulate’ [that] speech as much as 
it hires that speech.  Expression is a teacher’s stock in trade, the commodity she 
sells to her employer in exchange for a salary.”).  The Mayer court also paid 
homage to the transparency and good-government arguments advanced by 
several commentators.  Id. at 479–80. 
 262. Evans-Marshall, 624 F.3d at 337 (applying Garcetti, Pickering, and 
Connick); Panse v. Eastwood, 303 F. App’x 933, 935 (2d Cir. 2008); Borden v. 
Sch. Dist. of Twp. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 171 n.13 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(holding that Garcetti’s applicability is an open question to out-of-class speech 
by a football coach); Brammer-Hoelter, 492 F.3d at 1202 (holding that Garcetti 
applies to out-of-class speech about curriculum and pedagogy); Mayer, 474 F.3d 
at 478–79 (applying Garcetti and Pickering); Lee, 484 F.3d at 694-95 n.11, 699 
(rejecting Garcetti but keeping Pickering and Connick for use in deciding faculty 
speech on issues unrelated to the subject in his classroom bulletin board; it 
deemed the speech curricular); Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 
1015–16 (9th Cir. 2000) (considering teacher speech on a hallway bulletin 
board, the court deemed it curricular and applied general government speech 
principles); Boring, 136 F.3d at 368 (holding that Pickering and Connick are 
applicable in a traditional curricular dispute); Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free 
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 722 (2d Cir. 1994) (relying on Hazelwood); 
Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 449, 452 (1st Cir. 1993) (Hazelwood); Miles v. 
Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 775 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that Hazelwood 
applies to in-class curricular speech); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1071 
(11th Cir. 1991) (holding that Hazelwood applies to university-level in-class 
speech of a teacher, impliedly also applicable to elementary and secondary 
teachers); Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d Cir. 
1990) (holding that Hazelwood does not apply to a teacher’s in-class speech); 
Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 718, 724 (8th Cir. 1998) 
(relying on Hazelwood); Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 797–98 (applying Pickering and 
Connick, decided before Garcetti). 
W03_BOWMAN  (DO NOT DELETE) 6/19/2013  4:24 PM 
2013] SPEECH IN SCHOOLS 259 
instructional speech as bearing the imprimatur of the school and 
thus being an extension of the school’s speech,263 as do some of the 
circuits focusing on Pickering, Connick, and/or Garcetti.264  
Additionally, as mentioned above, the four circuits to rely on 
Garcetti talk about the school hiring the teacher’s speech, and one 
other circuit focuses on the school’s control of the curriculum 
generally.265  The only circuit whose approach does not include 
government speech principles may have been limited by the facts of 
the case because the teacher was not affirmatively speaking.266 
3. Teachers’ Instructional Speech: A Better Fit with the 
Government Speech Doctrine 
As the Supreme Court has noted many times, public schools are 
unique institutions for purposes of the First Amendment.  But, the 
characteristics that make schools unique do not operate to bar the 
government from using the government speech doctrine as a defense 
to teachers’ instructional speech claims.  Reaching this conclusion is 
not easy. 
To begin with, the government speech doctrine is a good fit for 
these conflicts at a basic level—courts have consistently recognized 
that the teacher is the agent of the school and the state when 
 
 263. Ward, 996 F.2d at 453 (“[A] teacher’s statements in class during an 
instructional period are also part of a curriculum and a regular class activity.”); 
Silano, 42 F.3d at 723 (holding that the teacher’s speech bore the imprimatur of 
the school); Brammer-Hoelter, 492 F.3d at 1204; Miles, 944 F.2d at 776–77 
(holding that the curriculum and teachers’ speech in the classroom bear the 
imprimatur of the school); Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1078 (“University’s restrictions 
with respect to classroom conduct issued under its authority to control 
curriculum.”). 
 264. Panse, 303 F. App’x at 935; Silano, 42 F.3d at 722; Lee, 484 F.3d at 
698–99 (“As a general proposition, students and parents are likely to regard a 
teacher’s in-class speech as approved and supported by the school, as compared 
to a teacher’s out-of-class statements . . .  Thus, because the Removed Items 
were posted on school-owned and controlled bulletin boards in a compulsory 
classroom setting, Lee’s actions in posting these Items would reasonably be 
imputed to [the school].”); Boring, 136 F.3d at 370-71 (“We agree . . . that the 
school, not the teacher, has the right to fix the curriculum.”); Johnson, 658 F.3d 
at 966 n.11. 
 265. Bradley, 910 F.2d at 1176 (“[N]o court has found that teachers’ First 
Amendment rights extend to choosing their own curriculum or classroom 
management techniques in contravention of school policy or dictates.”); see also 
Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 795 (“The first amendment has never required school 
districts to abdicate control over public school curricula to the unfettered 
discretion of individual teachers.”); Downs, 228 F.3d at 1005 (“[W]hether the 
First Amendment compels a public high school to share the podium with a 
teacher with antagonistic and contrary views when the school speaks to its own 
constituents on the subject of how students should behave towards each other 
while in school.  The answer to this question clearly is no.”). 
 266. The teacher failed to enforce the school’s antiprofanity rules in class 
and on student assignments.  Lacks, 147 F.3d at 720. 
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delivering the curriculum, and thus the core idea of the government 
speech doctrine—that the government cannot be forced to express a 
viewpoint it does not want to adopt—makes sense as a restriction on 
teachers’ speech.267  In fact, the doctrine has an even better initial fit 
than in the student- and parent-initiated cases because these are 
situations where an agent of the state (a teacher) is trying to change 
the state’s message (the curriculum).  During the past couple of 
decades, circuits have trended solidly in the direction of deferring to 
states and school boards, rather than to teachers, about 
instructional speech.  As the Sixth Circuit noted in 2010: “[W]hen it 
comes to [a teacher’s] in-class curricular speech at the primary or 
secondary school level, no . . . court of appeals has held that such 
speech is protected by the First Amendment.”268  This direction is 
consistent even with the most employee-protective public employee 
speech case, Pickering.269  Even though teachers would not win 
future such cases under the government speech doctrine, teachers 
do not win these cases as it is under the existing doctrinal rules.270  
As a result, the government speech doctrine would not change 
outcomes or, at a practical level, permit more viewpoint 
discrimination than the current tests allow. 
The analytical process in some circuits would change, however, 
because the government speech doctrine requires substantial 
 
 267. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 411, 418–19 (2006).  The circuits 
that apply Garcetti adopt this reasoning; however, only four circuits do so.  Also, 
as noted above, this is likely much less clear to the students, especially 
elementary school children who are experiencing the speech, but the Court 
shows no signs of engaging that issue.  See generally Stuller, supra note 242 
(discussing the history of academic freedom in high schools). 
 268. Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 624 F.3d 332, 343 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 269. Gee, supra note 230, at 440–42. 
 270. Garcetti’s academic freedom caveat likely will come into play only in 
higher education, and it does not strengthen the rights of elementary and 
secondary school teachers in any way relevant to this discussion.  See generally 
Areen, supra note 242 (acknowledging that the application of Garcetti to 
colleges and universities remains an open question and making the case that 
Garcetti should not apply to college and university faculty).  Although Garcetti 
carved out a potential exception for academic freedom concerns, courts have 
never put much stock in the academic freedom claims of elementary and 
secondary school teachers.  Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425; Johnson v. Poway Unified 
Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 966 n.12 (9th Cir. 2011).  Academic freedom rights and 
interests are very different at the elementary/secondary and higher education 
contexts.  See, e.g., Buss, supra note 144, at 233, 274–77; Robert C. Post, 
Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 164–65 (1996) (“[A] public university is 
therefore a managerial domain dedicated to the achievement of education, and, 
as one might expect, public universities routinely regulate the speech of faculty 
and students in ways required by that mission.”); Waldman, supra note 106, at 
105–06.  Nonetheless, some commentators have argued for stronger academic 
freedom rights at the elementary/secondary level.  See, e.g., Karen C. Daly, 
Balancing Act: Teachers’ Classroom Speech and the First Amendment, 30 J.L. & 
EDUC. 1 (2001); Stuart, supra note 250, at 1319–20; Stuller, supra note 242. 
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judicial deference to the school board and the state.271  Specifically, 
future cases in circuits that currently use the Hazelwood test would 
more likely be disposed of via a motion to dismiss earlier in 
litigation under the government speech doctrine because teachers’ 
speech rights would be weaker—formally and officially, at any 
rate—than they currently are in practice under Hazelwood.  This 
raises two questions: first, is jettisoning the Hazelwood test in this 
area acceptable, and second, does the weakening of the litigation 
route undermine the public goods that education produces?  As 
Emily Gold Waldman has emphasized when arguing that 
Hazelwood should not apply to these types of cases, the fundamental 
relationship at issue in teacher instructional speech cases is an 
employer-employee relationship.272  That relationship was not at 
issue in Hazelwood and is not accounted for in the Hazelwood 
test.273  Thus, ceasing the use of Hazelwood in these cases would 
return Hazelwood to what Waldman contends, and I agree, is a more 
appropriate scope. 
That is not to say the government speech doctrine is without 
costs.  Using the government speech doctrine to resolve teacher 
instructional speech cases more generally could have the effect of 
deterring similar future litigation, especially because of an inability 
to recover fees from the government when losing on a motion to 
dismiss.  Neither the direct impact of the government speech 
doctrine nor this chilling effect directly impacts either public good 
education produces, though.  The first public good education 
produces, the good of creating citizens, is focused on students 
becoming civically engaged adults because they learn social and 
democratic values in public schools both through the direct 
curriculum and indirectly through the school rules.274  Teachers’ 
instructional speech rights (as opposed to students’ and parents’ 
rights) are not a part of this public good in any substantial way.  
Students might benefit from more substantively diverse instruction 
or pedagogy in a way that enhances citizenship development, but 
this result is not an interest the law recognizes as one that teachers 
hold.  Additionally, it is important to note that the government 
speech doctrine would not foreclose all claims teachers could bring 
in situations that involve disputes about in-class speech.  For 
 
 271. Waldman, supra note 106, at 94–95 (“[A] ruling that Hazelwood applies 
to a teacher’s in-class speech and prohibits all viewpoint-based speech 
restrictions would clearly transfer tremendous authority from democratically 
elected school boards to individual teachers.  Indeed, such a ruling would 
largely undermine a school board’s ability to shape and control what students 
learn in their classrooms.”). 
 272. Id. at 102. 
 273. Id. 
 274. See supra Part I.A. 
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example, Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court’s 1923 decision striking 
down Nebraska’s ban on foreign language instruction before eighth 
grade, involved due process claims which would be untouched by the 
government speech doctrine.275 
The second public good, the enforcement public good, is focused 
on ensuring that public schools create the next generation of citizens 
in a constitutionally sound way.  Thus, a meaningful check on the 
state’s or school district’s decision must exist.  If the government 
speech doctrine is not available as a defense in textbook and 
curricular selection cases initiated by parents and students, then 
this second public good remains viable because students and parents 
can bring lawsuits which do not involve the complications of the 
employment relationship between teachers and schools.  As noted 
above, teachers can only bring suit on their own behalf—any 
litigation-generated benefit to their students is tangential.  Thus, 
the political process is the only option through which teachers could 
act as advocates and attempt to create this enforcement public good 
on behalf of their students. 
In sum, the government speech doctrine is a solid fit for 
teachers’ instructional speech cases, and applying it does not 
materially compromise the central public goods that public 
education creates. 
C. Library Collections and the Quiet Death of Pico 
Schools’ management of their library collections is similar in 
important ways to states’ and schools’ textbook selection and 
curricular determination decisions: most notably, when states and 
school districts select or deselect library books, they determine what 
information will be available to their students and, in that way, bear 
the approval of the school.  The school library context is slightly 
different than the classroom context, and the Supreme Court has 
treated the two situations as such. 
1. The Pico Case, and Pico as Precedent 
In 1982, the Court resolved the question presented in Board of 
Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico276 
via a badly fractured decision that has been troubling to lower 
courts and commentators ever since.  The facts giving rise to Pico 
are relatively straightforward: at a conference organized by a 
politically conservative organization, three members of a New York 
school board received lists of library books the organization 
suggested were inappropriate for students.277  Guided by those lists, 
 
 275. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400–03 (1923). 
 276. 457 U.S. 853 (1982). 
 277. Id. at 856. 
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the board disregarded some of its own policies and procedures for 
school library book removal and eventually removed copies of nine 
books by authors including Kurt Vonnegut, Alice Childress, Eldridge 
Cleaver, and Richard Wright.278  The board described the removed 
books as “anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, and just plain 
filthy.”279  Students challenged the action, and the case eventually 
made its way to the Supreme Court. 
The Court’s decision in Pico was complicated.  A majority of 
Justices could only agree about the bare outcome—that the school 
district’s actions were not permissible.280  The reasoning of three of 
those Justices went as follows: deference to state and local 
authorities about education is important but not unlimited 
(consistent with the relevant Supreme Court cases discussed 
earlier); students’ rights to freedom of expression include a 
correlative right to receive ideas; a school has discretion to control 
the library collection—though not as much discretion as it has to 
control the curriculum, and this discretion “may not be exercised in 
a narrowly partisan or political manner.”281  A fourth Justice agreed 
only with the very last step of that reasoning, that “certain forms of 
state discrimination between ideas are improper. . . .   [T]he State 
may not act to deny access to an idea simply because state officials 
disapprove of that idea for partisan or political reasons.”282  Thus, a 
total of four Justices appeared to agree that the constitutional harm 
was the invidious partisan or political viewpoint discrimination 
exercised by the school board.283  A fifth Justice joined in the result 
but found it unnecessary to reach the constitutional issue.284  The 
dissenting Justices critiqued the plurality’s reasoning and also 
focused on the importance of deferring to the local, elected school 
board.285 
Pico was not written as a government speech decision.  In fact, 
it was decided almost a decade before the seminal government 
speech case Rust v. Sullivan.286  It was written while the forum 
analysis doctrine was strong, but it was not a forum analysis 
 
 278. Id. at 856 & n.3, 857 & n.4. 
 279. Id. at 857. 
 280. Id. at 854. 
 281. Id. at 864–70. 
 282. Id. at 878–79 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 283. Bezanson & Buss, supra note 85, at 1418; Rosemary C. Salomone, Free 
Speech and School Governance in the Wake of Hazelwood, 26 GA. L. REV. 253, 
264–65 (1992). 
 284. Pico, 457 U.S. at 883 (White, J., concurring). 
 285. Id. at 891 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 893 (Powell, J., dissenting); 
id. at 921 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 286. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
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decision.287  As explained above, it also was not a decision with a 
substantive majority on any question other than the bare outcome, 
and thus, soon after Pico was decided, a plurality of the Fifth Circuit 
en banc held in a public television case that Pico had no precedential 
value.288  In 2009, in a case factually very similar to Pico, the 
Eleventh Circuit adopted the Fifth Circuit’s view in ACLU v. Miami-
Dade County School Board289 and also suggested that because 
almost none of the Justices who decided Pico remained on the Court, 
it was hardly worth trying to apply Pico even in the spirit of reading 
the tea leaves.290  Then, the Eleventh Circuit declared that although 
it was “unclear” whether Pico or Hazelwood governed the case at 
hand, the school district won because its actions were motivated at 
least in part by factual inaccuracies in the nonfiction elementary 
school books in question, and thus the school district’s action 
survived under both Pico and Hazelwood.291  (The Eleventh Circuit’s 
decision is the only federal appellate decision since Pico that has 
presented a school library book removal controversy.292)  In 2010, 
the First Circuit noted in a case about state curricular requirements 
that “Pico’s rule of decision . . . remains unclear.”293 
2. Pico and the Government Speech Doctrine 
For some of the same reasons discussed in the previous two 
Subparts, the government speech doctrine at first appears to be a 
solid fit for library book removal cases.  This argument is weaker 
than in the textbook and curriculum selection cases or in the teacher 
instructional speech cases, however, and ultimately it is undermined 
by the impact on the public goods that public education is intended 
to create. 
Applying the government speech doctrine to the facts of Pico 
would result in an outcome opposite from the Supreme Court’s: the 
school board would win, and the viewpoint discrimination that 
 
 287. Mark S. Nadel, The First Amendment’s Limitations on the Use of 
Internet Filtering in Public and School Libraries: What Content Can Librarians 
Exclude?, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1117, 1132 (2000). 
 288. Muir v. Ala. Educ. Television Comm’n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1045 n.30 (5th 
Cir. 1982). 
 289. 557 F.3d 1177, 1200 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. at 1202, 1207. 
 292. Book banning disputes remain alive and well, but book removal cases 
are few and far between.  ABFFE’s Banned and Challenged Book List,  
AM. BOOKSELLERS FOUND. FOR FREE EXPRESSION, http://www.abffe.org/ 
?BBWBookList (last visited Jan. 27, 2013); Claire Mullally,  
Banned Books, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (Sept. 13, 2002), 
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/banned-books. 
 293. Griswold v. Driscoll, 616 F.3d 53, 57 (1st Cir. 2010).  (Justice Souter 
was appointed to the Court years after it decided Pico.)  Brownstein, supra note 
10, at 754–55; Nadel, supra note 287, at 1126. 
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occurred in that case would be permissible.  Accordingly, an 
important point bears repeating—if the government speech doctrine 
is available, it protects a full range of viewpoints, as long as an 
expressed view does not violate the Establishment Clause or other 
“law, regulation, or practice.”294  Thus, to argue that the government 
speech doctrine should apply, one must be willing to let the 
government protect speech with which one does not agree.  At the 
same time, if we conclude that the doctrine should not apply, it 
should not be because we are trying to protect our own agenda(s) but 
rather because applying the doctrine either does not further the 
doctrine’s core purposes, or one or more public goods connected to 
education would be abridged substantially. 
In library book removal cases the government is a speaker in 
much the same way the city was a speaker in Summum. Both 
library books and monuments are semipermanent property that is 
intentionally acquired and maintained by the government over the 
course of years.295  Although school libraries and public parks can be 
public fora for other purposes (public meetings, for example), they 
are not public fora for the purpose of maintaining a collection of 
books or monuments—it is not possible to acquire all existing books 
or accept all potentially donated monuments without defeating the 
purpose of either space.296  Thus, the government must choose some 
books and monuments and decline others, and in doing so set forth 
ideas it declares valuable and with which it is willing to be 
associated.  Removing a book arguably communicates that the book 
has less value than other books that remain in the collection, 
whether because it has come to contain outdated information, it 
contains age-inappropriate information, it appears to support values 
 
 294. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009).  The 
government speech doctrine also could be limited by the Equal Protection 
Clause so that it does not permit the further disadvantaging of protected 
classes—particularly, racial/ethnic minorities (non-Whites) and girls/women.  
Arons & Lawrence, supra note 99, at 349–50; Burcham, supra note 99, at 236–
37; Hendricks & Howerton, supra note 99, at 634–35. 
 295. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 470–71.  School districts, with librarians as 
their agents, have control over their own library collections; books cannot 
become part of a school library’s collection without the school’s permission.  
Librarians use school funds to purchase a book or accept it as a donation, at 
which point the book becomes the school’s property, and the school marks it as 
such.  If an individual leaves a book in a school library, it does not come to have 
the indicia of being school property until a school official affirmatively takes 
steps to enter the book into the library’s catalogue and physically mark the book 
as part of the collection.  It is typical for library books, whether belonging to a 
school or to a public library, to carry a sticker on their spine with Dewey 
Decimal System classification and other information, and the owner’s name is 
stamped on the book. 
 296. Id. at 478–79. 
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school officials find objectionable, or it is almost never used.297  
Whether the government adoption of this private speech, and the 
resulting message of endorsement, is strong enough to constitute a 
viewpoint is debatable.  However, these weaknesses alone do not 
invalidate the potential classification of this speech as government 
speech. It seems at least as clear as it was in Summum that school 
libraries’ decisions to acquire some books and reject others do 
constitute speech; that the decisions are government speech, not 
hybrid speech; and that the government conveys a viewpoint by 
owning library books and making them available to students.298 
Supreme Court and circuit-level case law do not add much to 
this analysis.  Pico is hardly solid precedent, and in fact it is such a 
confusing decision that three circuits have publicly questioned its 
precedential value.299  On the rare occasions when Pico is applied, it 
does not control the case.300  Additionally, Pico can be read as 
leading to the result that a school has more control over its speech in 
the classroom than over its speech in the library.  In fact, the 
opposite outcome would make more sense—students in classrooms 
are captive audiences and thus the government’s classroom speech 
arguably should be subject to greater checks because the speech has 
the potential to have a more substantial impact.  In libraries, 
students are not captive audiences, in the sense that they are not 
compelled to read or learn one perspective—students have access to 
a range of ideas in a school library including access to the internet.  
The school board’s decision to remove a library book is a drop in the 
bucket; the school board’s decision to use or not use a particular 
textbook is much more than that.  This, too, weighs in favor of 
employing the government speech doctrine: if the impact of the 
government speech doctrine is minimal and the hearers are elective, 
then why worry much about what viewpoint the speech conveys? 
Well, consider the central mission of a school library—to provide 
students access to a range of materials and ideas and thus enhance 
 
 297. Furthermore, it is important to note that the viewpoint a school conveys 
by owning library books is weaker than that it communicates by selecting 
textbooks and approving curriculum.  When students are a compelled audience 
being required to learn certain material in a classroom, the government’s 
viewpoint is stronger.  When students must opt in to being an audience, and 
even then may disregard what they read, as in a school library, the 
government’s viewpoint is weaker.  The voluntariness may affect the strength of 
the viewpoint, but it does not change the government’s status as speaker.  See 
Brownstein, supra note 10, at 798 (“[W]hen the state restricts speech based on 
its content, an imprimatur of disapproval is likely to be perceived.”). 
 298. See supra Part I.A. 
 299. Additionally, Justices and commentators ask whether it applies to 
putting books in or only taking books out, and whether some right to receive 
information animates the decision and if so where that right comes from and 
how far it extends. 
 300. See supra Part II.C. 
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their knowledge about the world and develop their critical thinking 
skills.  A school library cannot present all possible viewpoints about 
topics addressed in its collection, and none are required to do so.301  
As discussed above, substantial de facto viewpoint discrimination 
happens in schools on a regular basis.302  Yet, it seems widely 
understood that school libraries are places that contain resources; 
they are not sources of indoctrination.  This is directly tied to the 
public good of creating citizens; if schools are to train students to 
become the next generation of citizens and sustain our democracy, 
they cannot do this by limiting students—especially in the place 
within the school that is supposed to be the source of a wide range of 
information—only to the views that the government wishes to 
convey.  Thus, at least at a conceptual level, the school library 
remains a significant part of how the school creates citizens. 
Applying the government speech doctrine to library book 
removal cases also would have an impact, albeit much smaller than 
in the classroom curriculum cases, on the enforcement public good.  
First, the inclusion or exclusion of a few books from a school library 
would seem to have a limited impact on students’ views and thus do 
little to add to the distortion of the political process.  As noted above 
in the curriculum discussion, though, the political process could 
already be distorted, and the distortion is what would lead to the 
decision to remove books from the library.  If distortion occurs either 
way, the litigation check becomes important.  And here, as in the 
situations noted above, the government speech doctrine would 
essentially eviscerate the litigation check: the government would be 
much more certain to win early in litigation via a motion to dismiss; 
if that happened, the plaintiff could not recover fees.  For one or 
both of those reasons the interest in challenging a book removal 
decision through litigation would be chilled. 
In sum, given the decent but not-overwhelming fit between the 
government speech doctrine and these cases, and the negative (but 
admittedly also not overwhelming) impact the government speech 
doctrine could have on the public goods connected to education, it is 
 
 301. See, e.g., Newton v. LaPage, 789 F. Supp. 2d 172, 192 (D. Me. 2011) 
(“Since subsequent caselaw has stated that government speech need not be 
viewpoint-neutral, any suggestion to the contrary in Serra and Pico is 
unpersuasive.”). 
 302. See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 85, at 1489 (“Without suggesting that 
all views are included and none generally excluded from the curricular and 
school library speech markets in public schools, one must acknowledge that the 
government speech that is communicated in the public schools is 
characteristically broad and inclusive rather than narrow and exclusive.  And 
the range of views available to students is expanded by reason of the right of 
students, under the Tinker case, to communicate their individual views during 
the school day.”). 
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a close call whether the government speech doctrine should apply to 
library book removal cases. 
Although the government properly has substantial authority to 
decide what materials to include in and exclude from school 
libraries, it also seems that that authority should not be effectively 
unlimited.  Some scholars have proposed specific ways to cabin in 
the government speech doctrine,303 but until those types of 
exceptions are a part of case law, it is unwise to bank on them.  
Accordingly, I conclude on balance that the government speech 
doctrine should not be applied to library book removal cases. 
IV.  STUDENTS’ SPEECH IN SCHOOLS 
The state and schools communicate many messages inside the 
schoolhouse gates, and so do students.  Some student speech merely 
happens to occur in classrooms or at school, other speech is 
necessary to complete assignments and take tests, and still other 
speech is made pursuant to curricular requirements but then 
becomes public in some way.  In the universe of school speech 
disputes, these types of student speech cases outnumber legal 
disputes about textbooks and curriculum.304  Courts also seek to 
balance the school’s role as educator with the student’s rights and 
interests as a citizen more than in the cases discussed previously.  
Accordingly, it is especially important to analyze how the 
government speech doctrine would apply in student speech cases 
and whether it should do so. 
A. The Student Speech Quartet 
Supreme Court case law contains four core student speech 
cases.305  The first, Tinker, was decided in 1969.  Tinker was a 
Vietnam War protest case and established the foundation for the 
student speech cases that came after.  In Tinker, the Court held that 
a school could discipline or quash speech that “materially and 
substantially interfere[s with] the requirements of appropriate 
 
 303. See Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement 38–40 (Brooklyn Law 
Sch. Legal Studies Res. Papers Working Paper Series, Paper No. 287, Dec. 
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2125243. 
 304. See generally, e.g., Kozlowski, supra note 254, at 1; Dan V. Kozlowski, 
Toothless Tinker: The Continued Erosion of Student Speech Rights, 88 
JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 352 (2011). 
 305. Meyer and Barnette are not considered core student speech cases.  
Meyer was about the language of instruction, and, as discussed above, its legacy 
is as a parental rights case.  Barnette was not clearly based on the Free Speech 
Clause, and, furthermore, it is a about a student’s right not to speak, rather 
than a right to speak.  The core student speech cases all involve situations in 
which students spoke and then were punished for that speech in some way, or 
the speech was quashed. 
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discipline . . . [or] schoolwork”306 if such an interference actually 
occurred or was reasonably anticipated,307 or if the speech “collid[es] 
with the rights of others.”308  This was the test proposed by the 
school, and although the Court adopted the school’s test, it held for 
the students.  As such, Tinker is commonly viewed as marking a sea 
change because unchecked deference to school districts in these 
matters became a thing of the past.309  As discussed in Part I.A, 
Tinker, like Brown v. Board of Education, justified its outcome by 
articulating schools’ role as one of creating the next generation of 
citizens. 
Fifteen years after Tinker, in 1984, the Court decided its second 
student speech case, Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, in 
which a student was disciplined for making a lewd speech at a 
school assembly, nominating his friend for a student government 
office.310  The Court did not apply the Tinker test in Fraser, but 
seemed to carve out a further exception to students’ speech rights: 
the school could restrict speech that was “vulgar,” “lewd,” or “plainly 
offensive.”311  As discussed above, the theme that public schools 
create citizens was present in Fraser, as well.  Three years after 
Fraser, the Court decided a different type of student speech case, 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the student newspaper case 
summarized above in Part III.A.1.  Because the facts of Hazelwood 
were different from Tinker, especially in that the school had a 
partial claim to the speech, the Hazelwood test has been applied by 
various circuits to general disputes about curriculum and textbook 
selection brought by students and parents, to disputes about 
teachers’ own instructional speech, and also to disputes about 
students’ speech.312  Hazelwood, too, contained language about 
providing students a civic education.  Most recently, in 2007, the 
Court decided Morse v. Frederick, in which a student displayed a 
fourteen-foot long banner reading “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” while the 
Olympic Torch parade passed by groups of students who had been 
released from school to watch the parade.313  Many open questions 
plague student speech doctrine, but the Court did not resolve any of 
them in Morse.314  Rather, it issued the narrow holding that “schools 
may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care from 
speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug 
 
 306. Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). 
 307. Id. at 510. 
 308. Id. at 513. 
 309. Bowman, supra note 5, at 1163–65. 
 310. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 311. Id. at 683. 
 312. See Parts II.A.2 and II.B.2; see also Waldman, supra note 106, at 113. 
 313. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2009). 
 314. Bowman, supra note 106, at 220. 
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use.”315  The public good of educating for citizenship was not a 
dominant theme, but the idea of protecting students instead 
emerged as a thread woven throughout the decision. 
More than its three sister cases, Hazelwood contains several 
contributions that are especially important to the question of 
schools’ authority over students’ curricular speech: First, it officially 
concluded what many had assumed—that even a journalism class in 
which students have great leeway over the topics they explore is not 
a traditional public or limited/designated public forum.316  Lower 
courts have applied this particular holding consistently.317  Second, 
the Court did not go so far as to declare this to be the school’s speech 
in its entirety.318  Rather, it implicitly acknowledged that the speech 
at issue was mixed speech by noting that the articles were written 
by the students, and yet also were part of the school curriculum and 
would bear “the imprimatur of the school” upon publication in the 
school newspaper.319  Third, because of the school’s unique interests 
in the speech, the Court authorized the school board to exercise 
broad authority over the student-created curricular speech and even 
employ this authority in ways that are not viewpoint neutral.320 
 
 315. Morse, 551 U.S. at 393; see also Bowman, supra note 106, at 215 
(describing Justice Alito’s stipulated terms of concurrence which appear not to 
alter Morse’s precedential value because Justice Alito joined the majority 
opinion in full). 
 316. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267–270 (1988).  As 
noted earlier, the forum analysis doctrine is of little use in school speech cases.  
See supra Part I.C. 
 317. Buss, supra note 144. 
 318. In Emily Gold Waldman’s words, “generally, the perception of 
imprimatur will be strongest in two situations: when the student speech 
changes the permanent physical appearance of the school or when the student 
speech changes the nature of other students’ substantive classroom experience.”  
Waldman, supra note 106, at 113. 
 319. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 270–71 (characterizing this category as 
including “school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other 
expressive activities”). 
 320. Id. at 271–72 (“Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over 
this . . . form of student expression to assure that . . . the views of the individual 
speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school. . . .  A school must also 
retain the authority to refuse to sponsor student speech that might reasonably 
be perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or conduct 
otherwise inconsistent with ‘the shared values of a civilized social order,’ . . . or 
to associate the school with any position other than neutrality on matters of 
political controversy.  Otherwise, the schools would be unduly constrained from 
fulfilling their role as ‘a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural 
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to 
adjust normally to his environment.’” (citations omitted)); id. at 271 (“Educators 
are entitled to exercise greater control over this . . . form of student expression 
to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the [curricular] activity is 
designed to teach.”); see also Bowman, supra note 106, passim; Waldman, supra 
note 106, passim. 
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How these four cases fit together is a matter of some debate, but 
they are all still good law.321  What does appear clear is that, taken 
together, the four core student speech cases are particularly 
deferential to government officials, especially when compared to 
nonschool speech cases, and the resolution of the student speech 
controversies confirms that governmental deference is a consistent 
theme in student speech cases generally.322  At the same time, these 
cases and others also contain substantial language that animates 
the role of the First Amendment in schools by emphasizing “[t]he 
importance of public schools in the preparation of individuals for 
participation as citizens.”323  And if schools are to serve this role, 
then someone must be able to enforce the expectation that they do 
so. 
B. Mixed Speech 
Students’ mixed speech controversies—cases like Hazelwood in 
which a student and school both have a claim to the speech—are 
newer on the scene than controversies about curriculum and 
textbooks.  In part, this timing probably reflects the comparatively 
later recognition of students as rights holders in conflicts about 
school speech, rather than the rights holders being only adults in 
the roles of parent or teacher.324 
1.  Two Points on the Mixed Speech Continuum 
The mixed speech cases discussed in this Subpart are split into 
two groups of cases.  The two categories each present a particular 
balance between the public and private claim to the speech, 
although both categories involve substantial public and private 
claims to the speech as well as overlapping considerations that 
influence the resolution of the normative question of whether the 
government speech doctrine should apply to cases in either of these 
groups.325 
 
 321. See, e.g., Anne Proffitt Dupre, Should Students Have Constitutional 
Rights? Keeping Order in the Public Schools, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 49 passim 
(1996); Laycock, supra note 106, at 112; Salomone, supra note 283. 
 322. James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 
1335, 1338, 1346–60 (2000). 
 323. Ambach v. Norwalk, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979); see also Bowman, supra 
note 21, at 935–36. 
 324. Tinker was not decided until 1969.  Although Barnette (1943) involved 
students’ rights, it appeared important that, under the West Virginia state 
statute, parents were liable for students’ truancy.  For a more general 
discussion of this, see YUDOF ET AL., supra note 66, at 223. 
 325. Although it is possible that the school in any of these cases could issue 
a disclaimer, attempting to transform the mixed speech back into private 
speech alone, the likelihood that the school would still be seen as endorsing the 
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First are Hazelwood-type cases, controversies about speech that 
a student generates as part of the curriculum but, through the 
school’s actions, the speech becomes public in some way and thus is 
arguably partially attributable to the school.  This category includes 
not only speech generated pursuant to the curriculum as 
traditionally defined but also student speech over which the school 
has substantial oversight and control, such as preparing materials 
(tiles, murals, et cetera) to be permanently affixed to the school 
building.  Recent cases in this category are dominated by two fact 
patterns—students’ religious speech (for example, a student 
including Christian images and language on a poster about saving 
the environment326) and to a lesser degree, students’ violent speech 
(for example, writing as a wish on a piece of paper to be posted in 
the hallway: “Blow up the school with the teachers in it”327).  It is 
not clear whether either type of speech occurs more frequently than 
it used to, and indeed the more extreme the speech is, the less likely 
students and parents are to attribute it the school as well as to the 
student speaker.  But, it does appear, at the very least, that 
students and parents are contesting with increasing frequency 
schools’ decisions to quash the speech or to discipline students for 
this speech.328  Eleven circuits—all but the District of Columbia 
 
speech in some way (either because the disclaimer would not be noticed or 
would not be taken seriously) seems high. 
 326. Peck ex rel. Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 621–22 
(2d Cir. 2005). 
 327. Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 714 F. Supp. 2d 462, 465 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).  To be clear, the district court evaluated Cuff under the Tinker 
standard and did not mention Hazelwood.  Id. at 467–68.  This is likely because 
it would be difficult to believe that a school was endorsing speech that 
advocated violence against the school itself.  However, the speech was made in 
the context of a curricular assignment.  Id. at 465. 
 328. See, e.g., Wilson v. Hinsdale Elementary Sch. Dist., 810 N.E.2d 637, 
639–41 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (explaining that the student was suspended after 
writing, recording, and bringing to school a song titled “Gonna Kill Mrs. Cox’s 
Baby.”  Mrs. Cox was the student’s pregnant science teacher.).  In her article, 
Emily Gold Waldman expertly analyzes Wilson and many other cases in which 
students have been disciplined for their hostile speech about teachers and 
administrators.  Emily Gold Waldman, Badmouthing Authority: Hostile Speech 
About School Officials and the Limits of School Restrictions, 19 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 591, 601–03 (2011).  The vast majority of the lower-court cases 
Waldman discusses have been decided in the past ten years, although 
admittedly her article analyzes speech that occurs online (and is thus much 
more likely to have been generated during the past decade) as well as speech 
that occurs on campus, or in other non-Internet media.  Id. at 591–93. 
  Religious speech raises concerns about the school appearing to endorse 
the student’s message and thus violating the Establishment Clause; cases 
focusing on these issues may be on the rise especially as some evangelical 
Christians in the United States increasingly perceive that their faith is 
unjustifiably excluded from the public sphere.  Bowman, supra note 106, at 200 
n.54 (listing cases involving students’ religious speech given as part of the 
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Circuit—have spoken about Hazelwood’s application to student 
public curricular speech controversies.329  Given the fact that 
Hazelwood involved this exact type of speech, it is not surprising 
that the circuits exhibit more consistency about the rule to be 
applied in student public curricular speech cases than in textbook 
and curricular determination cases.330  All six circuits that have 
decided cases about students’ public curricular speech have applied 
Hazelwood.331  Three other circuits have stated or indicated in 
teacher speech cases that the Hazelwood standard applied to 
 
curriculum, although unlike the violent speech cases, many of these cases had 
their genesis in the 1990s).  For contemporary discussion of Christians in the 
United States perceiving themselves to be a “victimized minority,” see, for 
example, Elizabeth A. Castelli, Persecution Complexes, REVEALER (Apr. 17, 
2008, 5:11 PM), http://therevealer.org/archives/2855; Andy Rau, Persecution and 
the American Christian ‘Martyrdom Complex,’ THINK CHRISTIAN (Apr. 24, 2008), 
http://www.thinkchristian.net/index.php/2008/04/24/persecution-and-the 
-american-christian-matyrdom-complex/ (a conservative Christian blog 
discussing Castelli’s essay); Ed Brayton, Dispatches from the Creation Wars –
The Roots of the Christian Persecution Complex, SCIENCEBLOGS (Apr. 28, 2008), 
http://scienceblogs.com/dispatches/2008/04/28/the_roots_of_the_christian 
_per.php (a nonreligious, science-focused blog discussing Castelli’s essay). 
 329. R.O. ex rel. Ochshorn v. Ithaca City Sch. Dist., 645 F.3d 533, 540–42 (2d 
Cir. 2011); Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 375–77 (5th Cir. 2011); Curry ex 
rel. Curry v. Hensiner, 513 F.3d 570, 577–78 (6th Cir. 2008); Lee v. York Cnty. 
Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 695–96 (4th Cir. 2007); Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 
734–35 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc); Peck, 426 F.3d at 628–29; Bannon v. Sch. Dist. 
of Palm Beach Cnty., 387 F.3d 1208, 1212–14 (11th Cir. 2004); Walz ex rel. Walz 
v. Egg Harbor Twp. Bd. of Educ., 342 F.3d 271, 276–77 (3d Cir. 2003); Fleming 
v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 923–24 (10th Cir. 2002); Downs 
v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1009–10 (9th Cir. 2000); Lacks v. 
Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, 147 F.3d 718, 724 (8th Cir. 1998); Ward v. 
Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 453 (1st Cir. 1993); Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 
773, 777 (10th Cir. 1991); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 
800–01 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 330. Waldman, supra note 106, at 113–18 (discussing cases where courts 
applied Hazelwood). 
 331. Ochshorn, 645 F.3d at 540–42; Morgan, 659 F.3d at 389; Curry, 513 
F.3d at 577–78; Peck, 426 F.3d at 628–29; Bannon, 387 F.3d at 1212–15; Walz, 
342 F.3d at 280–81; Fleming, 298 F.3d at 929.  One caveat to the summary of 
circuit law is necessary: four years after the Second Circuit decided a student 
curricular speech case using Hazelwood, it issued an unpublished, summary 
order in another student curricular speech case using Tinker’s substantial or 
material disruption as echoed in Morse, without in fact mentioning Hazelwood, 
much less describing its reasons for not applying Hazelwood to the case at 
hand.  Peck, 426 F.3d at 628–29; Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 341 
F. App’x 692, 693 (2d Cir. 2009).  This may be because the type of speech 
arguably connects to the “imprimatur of the school” factor from Hazelwood.  
Basically, it is more plausible that a school would permit, accept, or endorse a 
student making a religious statement—although the Second Circuit ultimately 
rejected the argument that that is what happened—than that a school would 
endorse a student’s violent speech. 
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general student curricular speech cases.332  The two remaining 
circuits, neither of which was considering an elementary/secondary 
student curricular speech at the time, indicated that Hazelwood is 
good law but may be limited by Bethel v. Fraser’s focus on the 
school’s educational mission, or by pertaining to student newspaper 
cases.333 
In the six circuits that have decided student public curricular 
speech cases, the students lost every case, although one case 
involving students’ religious speech was decided on qualified 
immunity grounds.334  As suggested above, a number of circuits 
defined “curriculum” broadly as including activities taking place on 
school grounds and involving school oversight, even if not a part of 
the state educational standards or district-adopted mandatory 
academic curriculum.335  Additionally, in the one circuit-level 
student newspaper case to be decided in recent years, the court 
applied Hazelwood and appeared unconcerned that the newspaper 
was not produced as part of a class for which students regularly 
received credit.336  (Some circuits also apply Hazelwood to cases 
involving students’ private curricular speech; those cases are 
addressed in a later Subpart.337) 
The second group of mixed speech cases, less frequently 
occurring than the first, involves student speech at large school-
sponsored events.  Recent controversies in this category include 
student speech at graduation ceremonies, school assemblies, and 
 
 332. Downs, 228 F.3d at 1010; Lacks, 147 F.3d at 724; Ward, 996 F.2d at 
453; see also Fleming, 298 F.3d at 921 (holding that speech of students, parents, 
and members of the public that might reasonably bear the imprimatur of the 
school can be controlled, to a degree, by school); Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 800–01 
(explaining that Hazelwood recognized that school officials may impose 
reasonable restrictions on the speech of students, teachers, and other members 
of the community in nonpublic forums). 
 333. Lee, 484 F.3d at 695–96; Hosty, 412 F.3d at 735, 741. 
 334. Peck, 426 F.3d at 620; Walz 342 F.3d at 272, 274–75; Morgan, 659 F.3d 
at 364; Curry, 513 F.3d at 573–74; Fleming, 298 F.3d at 920; Bannon, 387 F.3d 
at 1210. 
 335. Walz, 342 F.3d at 279–80; Morgan, 659 F.3d at 388–89 & n.127; 
Fleming, 298 F.3d at 924; Bannon, 387 F.3d at 1214.  Justice Thomas’s 
concurrence in Morse v. Frederick similarly described Hazelwood: “The Court 
characterized newspapers and similar school-sponsored activities ‘as part of the 
school curriculum’ . . . .”  551 U.S. 393, 418 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988)); Justice 
Scalia’s dissent in Lee v. Weisman, describing Abington v. Schempp: “In 
Schempp, for example, we emphasized that the prayers were ‘prescribed as part 
of the curricular activities of students who are required by law to attend 
school.’”  505 U.S. 577, 643 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963)). 
 336. Osborn, 645 F.3d at 536, 542.  
 337. See, e.g., Cox v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 267, 270–73 
(2d Cir. 2011); supra Part IV.C. 
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student government campaigns.  Matthew Fraser’s lewd speech is a 
classic example of this type of case.338  In these situations, the school 
has substantial control over the event, but its control is limited to 
prior approval of speakers and speeches and to cutting off speakers 
mid-comment.  Similar to the student public curricular speech cases, 
many of these cases involve religious speech, and some constitute 
part of the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence.339  The test 
from Fraser does not dominate circuit-level case law about these 
types of cases, likely because lewd speech is only one type of speech 
that schools would like to prohibit.  Surprisingly, it appears that 
only five circuits have considered cases involving nonreligious 
student speech at school-sponsored programs.  Of those five circuits, 
three used the Hazelwood test,340 one recent unpublished decision 
employed Tinker and Hazelwood but used language reminiscent of 
the government speech doctrine,341 and the last used a time, place, 
and manner test from Cornelius v. NAACP.342  Students lost all five 
cases.343 
2. Why Hazelwood Should Continue to Apply to Mixed 
Student Speech Cases 
Although the government speech doctrine would have a 
marginal effect at most on the outcomes of mixed speech cases—the 
government would continue to win overwhelmingly344—for multiple 
reasons, the government speech doctrine is not a solid fit for 
students’ mixed speech cases and should not be applied in these 
cases.  Rather, Hazelwood, which was crafted to address these types 
of situations, should continue to apply to student mixed speech 
controversies. 
 
 338. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677–79 (1986). 
 339. See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 580–81 (discussing middle school graduation 
remarks made by an invited clergyperson); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 
530 U.S. 290, 324 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that a student 
gave a religious blessing at a school football game; the school’s role in securing 
the speaker was more indirect than in Lee v. Weisman); Haupt, supra note 111, 
at 611.  As noted previously, because the government speech doctrine is not a 
defense to the Establishment Clause, and because the government can be held 
responsible for its portion of mixed speech under the Establishment Clause, this 
Article does not engage the religious aspects of those speech claims. 
 340. Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist. No. 38, 566 F.3d 1219, 1229 (10th 
Cir. 2009); Henery ex rel. Henery v. City of St. Charles Sch. Dist., 200 F.3d 
1128, 1136 (8th Cir. 1999); Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 758 (6th Cir. 1989). 
 341. Doe v. Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist., 402 F. App’x 852, 855 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 342. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing 
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799–800 
(1985)). 
 343. See cases cited supra notes 340–42. 
 344. Kozlowski, supra note 254, at 46–47. 
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Fundamentally, the basic purpose of the government speech 
doctrine—to preserve government control over government speech—
is not served by applying the doctrine to these cases, which would 
permit the school to restrict mixed speech for almost any reason.345  
As Hazelwood implicitly and importantly recognizes, mixed speech 
is not exclusively the school’s but instead is generated by a student 
and then becomes public in some way that also results in attribution 
to the school.346  Hazelwood’s rational basis-like test accords 
substantial, but not unchecked, deference to schools, and, in this 
way, Hazelwood is in line with Meyer, Barnette, Epperson, and 
Aguillard.347  Because Hazelwood recognizes shared interest in the 
speech, its test lets the student retain control over the speech unless 
the school’s restriction is “reasonably related to a legitimate 
pedagogical reason.”348 
Setting aside the Hazelwood test and misclassifying mixed 
speech as either purely private or purely governmental would lead 
to substantial problems, as discussed earlier.349  If mixed speech 
were misclassified as purely private, the speech would be governed 
by Tinker, Fraser, and Morse and the government would have less 
control over the speech than it does under Hazelwood.  Although 
this may at first be appealing to students’ rights advocates, such a 
misclassification also would mean that the government would not be 
held responsible for its role in the speech, which would be 
inconsistent with various Establishment Clause cases involving 
mixed speech.350  On the other hand, if the speech were misclassified 
as purely governmental, then the government could restrict it for 
nearly any reason, including a viewpoint-discriminatory reason; 
however, because the speech would still appear to be mixed speech if 
not entirely student speech, the government would likely not be held 
accountable through the political process as readily as it could be 
held accountable for textbook selection, for example, which is clearly 
 
 345. As noted earlier, the Establishment Clause and “limit[ing] law, 
regulation, or practice” are the only limits the Court has set forth.  Pleasant 
Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009). 
 346. Cf., Chiras v. Miller, 432 F.3d 606, 616 (5th Cir. 2005) (rejecting a 
viewpoint discrimination claim brought by a textbook author).  Of course, 
textbooks and curricula are written by individuals, but those individuals then 
sell their work to publishers who sell it to schools.  Just like the school 
“purchases” the speech of its teachers, it purchases the books and curricula it 
uses.  The original authors may retain rights such as copyright, but they do not 
have free speech-type rights regarding their work in the school setting. 
 347. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 348. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
 349. Lidsky, supra note 73, at 2024 (noting the importance of recognizing 
mixed speech when applying the government speech doctrine); see Corbin, supra 
note 117, at 662; supra Part II.B.2. 
 350. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
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government speech.351  Recognizing that the speech is mixed and 
evaluating its restriction under Hazelwood avoids all of these 
undesirable consequences. 
Additionally, Hazelwood effectively takes somewhat of a middle 
position when it comes to the permissibility of viewpoint 
discrimination.  To be clear, circuits are split on whether Hazelwood 
permits viewpoint discrimination,352 although I have argued 
elsewhere that Hazelwood permits at least the noninvidious 
viewpoint discrimination that is necessary for the rule in Hazelwood 
to be fully operational (the same, I have argued, is true regarding 
Tinker, Fraser, and Morse).353  The government speech doctrine is 
not similarly constrained; indeed, the core of the government speech 
doctrine is the idea that the government can choose to express a 
viewpoint and cannot be forced by individuals to change its 
message.354  Thus, given that it is important to recognize students’ 
limited speech rights in public schools and thus train them to be the 
next generation of citizens,355 it is better to permit limited viewpoint 
discrimination under Hazelwood, rather than to permit unchecked 
viewpoint discrimination as the government speech doctrine would 
allow. 
Allowing Hazelwood to continue to function rather than 
permitting the government speech doctrine is also consistent with 
the public goods articulated earlier.  When schools must justify their 
restriction of mixed speech, rather than having the ability to restrict 
carte blanche, then students learn that unpopular and undesirable 
opinions can be expressed—and yet they also learn that there are 
limits to what is appropriate in a particular setting such as a school.  
Additionally, although some advocate for greater protection of 
students’ speech rights, Hazelwood by itself provides a meaningful 
judicial check on schools’ restriction of students’ mixed speech.  And 
if schools comply with Hazelwood, then schools produce adults who 
engage appropriately in public debate, and thus the political process 
check is also functional in both the short and long term. 
Therefore, continuing to apply Hazelwood to student mixed 
speech is preferable to forcing the government speech doctrine on a 
category of cases where its fundamental purpose would not be 
 
 351. On the importance of the political process to the government speech 
doctrine, see Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–69 (2009). 
 352. Brownstein, supra note 10, at 781–82; Kozlowski, supra note 254, at 21 
n.133; Waldman, supra note 106, at 90–94. 
 353. Bowman, supra note 106, at 209–14. 
 354. See supra Part I.A. 
 355. Bowman, supra note 21, at 935–36. 
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achieved and in which it would undermine the public goods most 
directly connected to education.356 
C. Student Organizations’ Speech and “Traditional” Student 
Speech Conflicts 
There is a point on the school speech continuum when circuits 
stop recognizing students’ in-school speech as mixed because the 
school no longer has an interest in the speech as an actual or 
perceived speaker.  In these cases, student organizations and 
individual students are the only speakers; the conflicts are about 
students’ speech on Facebook and other online fora,357 students’ 
message-bearing t-shirts,358 students distributing flyers in school for 
nonschool events,359 students’ private curricular speech,360 religious 
student groups seeking school recognition while attempting to 
impose restrictions on their members,361 and gay and lesbian 
alliance student groups seeking school recognition.362  These are the 
traditional student speech cases for which circuits continue to use 
Tinker primarily, with dashes of Fraser, Hazelwood, Morse, and a 
time, place, and manner test added in on occasion.  In terms of 
quantity, these conflicts dominate school speech cases.363  Students 
win cases in this category more often than in the other categories 
 
 356. As Emily Gold Waldman states, the “entire rationale and approach [of 
Hazelwood] are uniquely suited to student speech.”  Waldman, supra note 106, 
at 99; see also Kozlowski, supra note 254, at 49–50. 
 357. Waldman, supra note 328, at 591–93. 
 358. Bowman, supra note 106, at 188–92, 199–201. 
 359. See, e.g., Child Evangelism Fellowship of N.J., Inc. v. Stafford Twp. 
Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 514 (3d Cir. 2004); Hills v. Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist. No. 
48, 329 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 360. See, e.g., Settle v. Dickson Cnty. Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 361. See Joan W. Howarth, Teaching Freedom: Exclusionary Rights of 
Student Groups, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 889, 896–98 (2009). 
 362. Doni Gewirtzman, Comment, “Make Your Own Kind of Music”: Queer 
Student Groups and the First Amendment, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1131, 1133–35 
(1998); Jordan Blair Woods, Gay-Straight Alliances and Sanctioning Pretextual 
Discrimination Under the Equal Access Act, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
373, 378–81 (2010) [hereinafter Woods, Gay-Straight Alliances]; Jordan Blair 
Woods, Morse v. Frederick’s New Perspective on Schools’ Basic Educational 
Missions and the Implications of Gay-Straight Alliance First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 281, 284–86 (2008) [hereinafter 
Woods, New Perspective]. 
 363. See, e.g., DeFabio v. E. Hampton Union Free Sch. Dist., 623 F.3d 71, 
77–78 (2d Cir. 2010); Defoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 324, 330–32 (6th Cir. 2010); A.M. 
ex rel. McAllum v. Cash, 585 F.3d 214, 221 (5th Cir. 2009); B.W.A. v. 
Farmington R-7 Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 734, 738–39 (8th Cir. 2009); Nuxoll ex rel. 
Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. # 204, 523 F.3d 668, 672–73 (7th Cir. 2008); 
Scott v. Sch. Bd. of Alachula Cnty., 324 F.3d 1246, 1248 (11th Cir. 2003); 
Walker-Serrano v. Leonard, 325 F.3d 412, 415–16 (3d Cir. 2003); West v. Derby 
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358, 1265–66 (10th Cir. 2000); Burch v. 
Barker, 861 F.2d 1149, 1150–53, 1157 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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discussed in this Article, but even still, a recent study documented 
that students won only thirty-five percent of circuit-level cases from 
2005 to 2010 when Tinker, arguably the most student-speech-
protective Supreme Court case, was the controlling test.364 
The doctrine governing these cases is a mess and circuit splits 
abound regarding important questions: Which test(s) should be used 
to evaluate a school’s restriction of online speech?365  What is the 
relationship between the Equal Access Act, which protects student 
organizations, and the First Amendment?366  How should a school 
official apply Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse, and is the 
uncertainty of the answer to that question enough to give a school 
administrator qualified immunity protection if he or she 
missteps?367  Should Hazelwood apply to private curricular speech 
such as exams and most written assignments, even though the 
speech never becomes public and thus never gains the imprimatur of 
the school in that way?368  Doctrinal coherence is desperately 
needed, but this Subpart does not explore the doctrinal morass in 
detail because the government speech doctrine is not a proper way 
to create such coherence.369 
Simply put, the government speech doctrine is fundamentally 
incompatible with this category of cases because the central purpose 
of the government speech doctrine is to protect the government’s 
ability to control its own message.370  Although circuits are split 
regarding the many issues discussed in the previous paragraph, 
 
 364. Kozlowski, supra note 304, at 358–59.  Students almost always lose 
under Hazelwood, too.  Brownstein, supra note 10, at 784. 
 365. See, e.g., Waldman, supra note 328, at 591. 
 366. Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir. 2008); Hsu v. 
Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 3, 85 F.3d 839, 856–57 (2d Cir. 1999); 
Gewirtzman, supra note 362, at 1134; Howarth, supra note 361, at 900–07; 
Woods, Gay-Straight Alliances, supra note 362, at 375 n.8; Woods, New 
Perspective, supra note 362, at 281–82. 
 367. Transcript of Oral Argument at 48–49, Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 
393 (2009) (No. 06-278); Curry ex rel. Curry v. Sch. Dist. of Saginaw, 452 F. 
Supp. 2d 723, 742 (E.D. Mich. 2006), aff’d on other grounds, 513 F.3d 570 (6th 
Cir. 2008); Laycock, supra note 106, at 111; Francisco M. Negron, Jr., A Foot in 
the Door? The Unwitting Move Towards a ‘New’ Student Welfare Standard in 
Student Speech Cases After Morse v. Frederick, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1221, 1235 
(2009); Kenneth Starr, From Fraser to Frederick: Bong Hits and the Decline of 
Civic Culture, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 661, 676 (2009); Woods, New Perspective, 
supra note 362, at 309. 
 368. See, e.g., Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 677 F.3d 109, 113 
(2d Cir. 2012); Cox v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 267, 272 (2d 
Cir. 2011); Kozlowski, supra note 254, at 21. 
 369. Brownstein, supra note 10, at  811 (“[C]urrent free speech doctrine does 
not provide federal judges, much less principals and teachers, with adequate 
guidance to enable them to determine whether restrictions on student speech in 
school-sponsored activities comply with constitutional standards.”). 
 370. See supra Part I.A. 
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they are not split regarding one foundational issue: that the speech 
in question is student speech and not mixed speech or the speech of 
the school.  Even what is the closest call—the speech of student 
organizations, which arguably could be classified as mixed speech 
between the organization and the school whose name it uses—
consistently has been classified by courts as purely student, 
nonmixed speech.371  Case law and statutory law justify schools’ 
 
 371. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 119 (2001); Lamb’s 
Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 387 (1993); 
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981); Haupt, supra note 111, at 609, 
615–16.  Official student organizations bear the name of the school and thus 
may appear to be supported or approved by the school when they speak.  
However, they are composed of individual students who share a common 
interest, which is in many cases a common viewpoint.  Most current disputes in 
this area involve schools’ refusal to recognize gay-straight alliance clubs or 
conservative Christian clubs; lack of recognition is sometimes related to some of 
those organizations’ restrictions on who can be a member or an officer.  See, e.g., 
Straights & Gays for Equal. v. Osseo Area Schs. Dist. No. 279, 540 F.3d 911 
(8th Cir. 2008); Hsu ex rel. Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist., 85 F.3d 839 (2d 
Cir. 1996).  These cases are brought mainly under the Federal Equal Access 
Act, which stipulates that a public school does not have to recognize 
extracurricular student groups whose focus is noncurricular (e.g., ski club, spirit 
club, chess club, etc.), although once it does so, it must provide equal access to 
school resources and facilities for all such clubs, including the recognition of 
those clubs as official student organizations.  20 U.S.C. § 4071 (2000).  The 
Supreme Court has held that the Equal Access Act’s de facto requirement that 
schools permit student religious groups to meet on their premises and to use the 
name of the school does not violate the Establishment Clause.  Bd. of Educ. 
Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 247 (1990).  Because the Court 
has found Establishment Clause violations in other situations involving 
students’ hybrid speech, presumably student organizations are further removed 
from the school, and thus the school’s role in the organization’s speech is so 
minimal that the Court did not hold the school liable under the Establishment 
Clause.  Free speech claims can appear in these cases in two ways—first, the 
school may refuse to recognize an organization under the theory that the 
organization would engage in speech that could be proscribed under Tinker, 
Fraser, Hazelwood, or Morse.  See id. at 226.  Second, the organization may 
argue that its free speech associational rights should allow it to place 
restrictions on membership and office holding even if such restrictions violate a 
school’s nondiscrimination policy.  Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 644–
45 (9th Cir. 2008); Hsu, 85 F.3d at 856 (upholding the organization’s decision to 
limit its officers to Christians). 
  The Court’s expressive association cases are Roberts v. United States, 
468 U.S. 609 (1984), Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 
537 (1987), and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).  These cases 
are based on the principle that an organization has a First Amendment right of 
association and that determining who can become a member or an officer is a 
core part of that right.  When such a determination violates federal, state, or 
school antidiscrimination laws or policies, the Court’s cases determine whether 
the determination should be allowed to stand.  See Howarth, supra note 361, at 
898.  These cases are not based on the idea that the speech is hybrid, however; 
they are based firmly on the understanding that the decision about membership 
or office-holding qualifications is the speech of the organization.  Although the 
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ability to restrict or punish the speech of students and student 
organizations because teachers and administrators must maintain 
order and enforce rules in the school environment so that the school 
achieves its educational purposes, not because schools have an 
independent speech interest in that same speech.372  Even the 
student private curricular speech cases that employ the Hazelwood 
test treat the speech as purely student speech.373  Because the 
speech in these cases is so clearly not the government’s, it makes 
little sense to give the government the expansive authority to 
regulate the speech that it would have if the government speech 
doctrine were deemed relevant. 
The basic conceptual incompatibility between the government 
speech doctrine and student speech cases is illustrated by 
attempting to apply the government speech doctrine to a typical 
student speech case.  Consider the following conflict: a student 
wears a t-shirt to school that says “BE ASHAMED, OUR SCHOOL 
EMBRACED WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED” and 
“HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL. Romans 1:27.”374  May the 
school punish the student for doing this?  To examine the free 
speech implications under the framework created by the Court, we 
would first ask whether the student’s speech could be restricted 
because it actually caused a substantial or material disruption to 
the school or could be expected to do so (Tinker375).  Then we would 
ask if it could be punished because it was lewd, vulgar, or otherwise 
inappropriate (Fraser376); because it bore the imprimatur of the 
school, and the school had a legitimate pedagogical reason for 
restricting it (Hazelwood377); or because it supported alcohol or drug 
use, or other dangerous or unhealthy behavior (Morse378). 
Although Hazelwood contains some government speech-like 
ideas, the government speech doctrine would only be analyzed as a 
defense to the individual’s First Amendment claim.  To avail itself of 
the doctrine, the school would need to claim that it also was 
speaking about these issues, which it might do through citing prior 
statements about being an “open and affirming” environment or 
arguably even a nondiscrimination policy or a part of the curriculum 
 
Court has not applied its expressive association cases to the public elementary 
and secondary school context, lower courts have done so, and there is no reason 
to assume these cases are necessarily irrelevant. 
 372. Haupt, supra note 111, at 572. 
 373. See, e.g., Peck ex rel. Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 
617 (2d Cir. 2005) (exemplifying a typical student public curricular speech 
case). 
 374. See Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 375. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). 
 376. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986). 
 377. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988). 
 378. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007). 
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that addressed homosexuality.  If the school could not even provide 
that weak evidence of its “speech” and “viewpoint,” then it would not 
be able to proceed with the defense.  Assuming it could go forward, 
though, the school would use its prior speech to argue that it has 
expressed a viewpoint and is not obligated to tolerate contrary 
speech in that same context. 
However, this interpretation of the government speech doctrine, 
which is necessary if the doctrine is going to apply to traditional 
student speech at all, is an incomplete reading of the government 
speech doctrine.  The doctrine is focused on the government being 
able to control its own message.  Student speech does not become 
government speech over which the government has full control 
merely because it is uttered in a school, and in fact Justice Alito’s 
concurring opinion in Morse, discussed earlier, specifically rejected 
the argument that a school can censor and punish speech simply 
because that speech is contrary to its educational mission (the Morse 
majority did not engage that issue).379  This misinterpretation of the 
government speech doctrine would nullify students’ speech rights 
under Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse wholesale by making 
all student and student organization speech into government speech 
over which the government had full control—which sounds precisely 
like the “enclaves of totalitarianism” the Court found so appalling in 
Tinker.380  It seems highly unlikely that a majority of the Justices 
who decided Summum in 2009 would have intended such a 
sweeping consequence, especially because all of the Justices who 
decided Morse v. Frederick in 2007 took part in the consideration of 
City of Pleasant Grove v. Summum.  Only Justice Thomas wrote in 
Morse that students should not have First Amendment rights in 
schools.381 
Last but certainly not least, the central constitutional purpose 
of protecting students’ free speech rights in schools—to train 
students to participate as citizens in a deliberative, self-governing 
democracy—would be lost if the government could quash any speech 
it desired.  The change also would arguably bleed into the political 
process that would no longer serve as a fully effective check on the 
state.  Because the judicial check would not be available given the 
reach of the government’s formal power under the government 
speech doctrine, no meaningful enforcement mechanism would be 
available.  Traditional student speech cases beg for doctrinal 
coherence, but the government speech doctrine is not the answer. 
 
 379. Id. at 423 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 380. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511. 
 381. Morse, 551 U.S. 393, 410–11 (Thomas, J., concurring).  Some of the rest 
of the Justices expressed concern about the vagaries of the doctrine, but no one 
else cast a vote to reject Tinker and its progeny.  Id. at 422 (Alito and Kennedy, 
JJ., concurring). 
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CONCLUSION 
Over thirty years ago, Steven Shiffrin was part of the core group 
of scholars to first explore the content and scope of ideas that 
eventually would become the government speech doctrine.  At that 
time, he wrote: 
[G]overnment subsidies of public school education raise what 
may be the most difficult questions in the government speech 
area: how to balance the effect of government speech on a 
captive audience of small children, a legitimate state interest 
in educating its citizenry, and a profound countervailing 
concern with preventing indoctrination and preserving 
individual choice.382 
Since Shiffrin wrote those words in 1980, the government 
speech doctrine has become a more cohesive idea, although it has 
not fully matured: in 2010, Justice Souter described the doctrine as 
“at an adolescent stage of imprecision.”383  School speech 
controversies have continued to evolve, as well, and disputes about 
students’ online speech, unthinkable three decades ago, now 
constitute many of the most visible student speech controversies.  
Much has changed in law and society, but Shiffrin’s words remain 
true: balancing the considerations he enumerated is not an easy 
task. 
Yet, the doctrine has taken shape just enough that balancing 
these considerations is the task I have undertaken in this Article.  
My analysis has asked whether applying the government speech 
doctrine to various types of school speech cases would achieve the 
doctrine’s basic purpose of ensuring that the government has control 
over its own message, while also preserving the role the First 
Amendment plays in schools and ensuring that such a role is 
performed in a constitutionally sound manner.  Of all the categories 
of school speech conflicts I have considered, I conclude that it is only 
in teachers’ instructional speech cases that the government speech 
doctrine is a solid fit and does not undermine too extensively either 
of the public goods connected most directly to education.  However, 
in all of the other categories—students’ and parents’ challenges to 
textbook selection and curriculum determination decisions, school 
library collection management, school/student mixed speech, and 
students’ traditional private speech—the government speech 
doctrine either is not a fit at a fundamental level, or it undermines 
one or both of the public goods so substantially that applying it to 
that category of cases is indefensible. 
 
 382. Shiffrin, supra note 79, at 622. 
 383. Griswold v. Driscoll, 616 F.3d 53, 59 n.6 (1st Cir. 2010). 
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Public schools in the twenty-first century face many challenges.  
One of the most significant ones is that they must continue to fulfill 
their core constitutional function—educating students to be the next 
generation of rights-bearing citizens—while maintaining enough 
order in schools so they can in fact create citizens as the Court and 
the country expects them to do.  This balance is precarious; the 
difficulty of preserving it is only outpaced by the importance of doing 
so. 
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